ACLU Letter to the Senate Opposing Expansions of Post-employment Bans and Regulations on Grassroots Lobbying (3/7/2006)
Re: Oppose expansions of post-employment bans and
regulations on grassroots lobbying
Dear Senator:
On behalf of the ACLU, a non-partisan organization with hundreds of thousands of activists and
members and 53 affiliates nation-wide, we urge you to oppose any
lobby reform proposals that create broad expansions to the post-employment bans
for former Members of Congress and congressional staff, such as S. 2128, the
“Lobbying Transparency and Accountability Act of 2006.” We also urge you to oppose the
regulation of grassroots lobbying currently contained in S. 2128. Both
provisions have serious consequences for constitutionally protected
activity.
Broad Expansion of Post-Employment Bans Infringes the Right to Petition the
Government for Redress of Grievances
S. 2128’s expansion of post-employment bans, intended to
alleviate the “revolving door” problem on Capitol Hill, poses serious First
Amendment concerns for both the former staff member who is barred from a form of
political speech and also the organization that is barred from using its
preferred representative to exercise its right to petition the government. The
Supreme Court has consistently required that such restrictions meet the
strictest standards, standards these proposals fail to meet. The ACLU believes the current ban is
already an infringement on First Amendment rights – expanding the ban to bar
former employees from lobbying not only the member or committee for whom they
worked but the entire Congress would further violate constitutional rights
without advancing the purpose of preventing corruption.
Former congressional staff do not lose their rights as a
result of having been employed by the government. The Supreme Court has ruled that
lobbying activity is political speech that is at the core of the First
Amendment.[1] The protected nature of this activity is
not altered by the fact that the speech is on behalf of others for a fee.[2] Additionally, the Court has found that,
without specific justification, the Constitution does not tolerate “[t]he loss
of First Amendment freedoms, even for minimal periods of time.”[3] This restriction must therefore be
judged by traditional First Amendment standards, including the requirement that
the restriction be narrowly drawn as to not impose limitations greater than
those necessary to protect the interest at stake.[4] Congress has failed to demonstrate a
need to expand current, more narrowly tailored restrictions.
The First Amendment additionally guarantees the right to
petition the government. Banning
organizations from hiring former congressional staff to lobby is denying an
organization the right to the advocate of its choice and thus stopping the
organization and its constituents from effectively exercising the right to
petition the government. Expanding
current post-employment bans will further inhibit the ability of organizations
to have their concerns heard by the government, while at the same time
preventing those most qualified for these positions the right to gainful
employment.
There is no doubt that the government has the right to
protect itself from improper activities by former government employees. However, this should be done in a way
that is mindful of the First Amendment and does not unnecessarily deny the
rights of individuals and organizations acting in good faith. There is no evidence that current bans
on employment of former congressional staff have had the desired effect of
reducing the “revolving door” problem on Capitol Hill, or any evidence that
expanding these bans will have this effect. Therefore, the American Civil Liberties
Union urges you to reject any proposals to broadly expand current
post-employment bans.
The Grassroots Lobbying Provision is Constitutionally
Suspect Because it Does Not Serve A Compelling Government Interest and is Not
Narrowly Tailored to Achieve the Asserted Goal.
The ACLU urges you to reject attempts to regulate grassroots
lobbying.
The right to petition the government is “one of the most
precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.”[5] When viewed through this prism, the
thrust of the grassroots lobbying regulation is at best misguided, and at worst
would seriously undermine the basic freedom that is the cornerstone of our
system of government.
It is well settled that lobbying, which embodies the separate
and distinct political freedoms of petitioning, speech, and assembly, enjoys the
highest constitutional protection.[6] Petitioning the government is “core
political speech,” for which First Amendment protection is “at its zenith.”[7]
Constitutional protection of lobbying is not in the least
diminished by the fact that it may be performed for others for a fee.[8] Further, “the First Amendment protects
[the] right not only to advocate [one’s] cause but also to select what [one]
believe[s] to be the most effective means of doing so.”[9] In Meyer, the Court emphasized that legislative
restrictions on political advocacy or advocacy of the passage or defeat of
legislation are “wholly at odds with the guarantees of the First Amendment.”[10]
Where the government seeks to regulate such First Amendment
protected activity, the regulations must survive exacting scrutiny.[11] To satisfy strict scrutiny, the
government must establish: (a) a compelling governmental interest sufficient to override the
burden on individual rights; (b) a substantial correlation between the
regulation and the furtherance of that interest; and (c) that the least drastic
means to achieve its goal have been employed.[12]
A compelling governmental interest cannot be established on
the basis of conjecture. There must
be a factual record to sustain the government’s assertion that burdens on
fundamental rights are warranted.
Here, there is little if any record to support the contention that
grassroots lobbying needs to be regulated.
Without this record, the government will be unable to sustain its
assertion that grassroots lobbying should be regulated.
The grassroots lobbying provision is troubling for other
reasons as well. First, the
provision seems to assume that Americans can easily be manipulated by advocacy
organizations to take actions that do not reflect their own interests. To the
contrary, Americans are highly independent and capable of making their own
judgment. Whether or not they were
informed of the problem through a grassroots campaign is irrelevant--their
action is based on their own belief in the importance of matters before
Congress.
Second, it appears that groups such as the ACLU may end up
having to report its activities because of the grassroots lobbying
provisions. A “grassroots lobbying
firm” means a person or entity that is retained by one or more clients to engage
in paid efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying on behalf of such clients and
receives income of, or spends or agrees to spend, an aggregate of $25,000 or
more for such efforts in any quarterly period. “Client” under existing law includes the
organization that employs an in-house staff person or person who lobbies. If,
for example, the ACLU hires an individual to stimulate grassroots lobbying on
behalf of the ACLU and pays that individual for her efforts in amounts exceeding
$25,000, it appears that individual would be considered a grassroots lobbying
firm, and would have to register and report as such. The fact that the ACLU employs that
individual appears to be irrelevant to this provision. Unless this is the type of activity that
the provision is intended to reach, there is no substantial correlation between
the regulation and the furtherance of the government’s alleged interest in
regulating that activity.
Another example of the broad reach of this provision is an
executive director of a state affiliate of an issue-oriented organization. Even
if she is paid a nominal amount and seldom or never interacts directly with
congressional offices, she could be forced to register as a federal “grassroots
lobbying firm” and file the quarterly detailed reports if that organization
itself (the “client”) spends more than $25,000 in a quarter encouraging the
general public to contact their federal elected representatives. Since a single
full-page advertisement in a major newspaper typically costs more than $25,000,
a lot of activists could be defined as “grassroots lobbying firms.”[13]
Finally, the grassroots lobbying provision may very well
expose strategy to one’s opponents.
The provision requires registration with the Secretary of the Senate and
the Clerk of the House of Representatives within 45 days after a grassroots
lobbying firm is retained in paid efforts to stimulate grassroots lobbying. This is sure to alert opponents to the
fact that an organization is about to engage in a grassroots lobbying
campaign. By having to report
expenditures, opponents are also able to deduce the extent of the campaign.
Because the grassroots lobbying provision is unsupported by
any record of corruption, and because the provision is not narrowly tailored to
achieve the government’s asserted interest, the provision is questionable
constitutionally. If our government is truly one “of the people, for the people,
and by the people,” then the people must be able to disseminate information,
contact their representatives, and encourage others to do so as well.
Conclusion
The Senate understandably is concerned about the appearance
of impropriety as well as unethical conduct. However, the Abramoff scandal has
already demonstrated that most of the activity engaged in by Mr. Abramoff is
already illegal. Responses to the scandal should not be taken as an opportunity
to suppress the people’s voices and their right to voice their opinions to their
elected representatives.
Sincerely,
Caroline Fredrickson Marvin J. Johnson Director
Legislative Counsel
[1]
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976). [2]
Buckley, supra at 16; see also Riley v. National
Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, 487 U.S.781 (1988). [3]
National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 927 F.2d 1253,
1254 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373
(1976)). [4]
See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1983). [5] United
Mineworkers Union v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 222
(1967). [6] Buckley, supra.
at 45 (1976). [7] Meyer v.
Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988). [8] Riley, supra.
at 801 (1988). [9] Meyer v.
Grant, supra. at 424. [10] Id. at
428. [11] Buckley,
supra. at 64. [12] Id. at
68. [13] In this scenario,
it is not the organization that is defined as a “grassroots lobbying firm,” but
the individual staffer.
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