

SUBJECT: DA Form 1574 Sections IV-Findings, V-Recommendations for AR 15-6 Investigation on 3d PLT, A Co, 1-184 IN for 01 March 05 Manslaughter Allegations

(3) Cordon and IP Linkup:

The platoon elements cordoned off the entrance to the western end of the block, IPs were seen moving toward the initial point of contact to the east. The IPs suffered one KIA and one WIA. They continued to receive RPK and AK-47 fire from the vicinity of [REDACTED] Street. IPs discussed the situation with SSG [REDACTED] and SSG [REDACTED] with the assistance of the interpreter, [REDACTED]. The IPs stated that they had taken RPG and PKC fire earlier from the roof top of the "3rd house from the left". [REDACTED] visually confirmed the house by the IPs pointing directly to it, and verbally describing the location and car parked in front of it. [REDACTED] relayed this to both squad leaders. (Tab L, [REDACTED]; Tabs K, [REDACTED]; [REDACTED])

(4) Attempted Close Combat Attack with Attack Aviation:

The Platoon Leader continued to attempt to guide Apache helicopters in on the [REDACTED] through direct fire on the house with tracers, laser pointers, and lights. The company commander also attempted to request a [REDACTED] strike on the house, based on the reports from 2LT [REDACTED]. The lack or absence of accurate and timely situation reports from the Platoon Leader to the Company Commander, and from the Company Commander to the 6-8 CAV Squadron, did not allow the chain of command to clearly understand the situation and correct the actions that were taking place. 2LT [REDACTED] reports to CPT [REDACTED] led him to believe that the [REDACTED] strike on the house reasonable. CPT [REDACTED], in turn, also pressed for attack aviation to destroy the house and occupants, without ever seeing the location first or inquiring about non-combatants in the house or area. (Tabs A, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED])

(5) Warning and Disabling Shots at a LN Vehicle running cordon:

The Patrol re-positioned their vehicles to cordon off the western end of the neighborhood. A vehicle bypassed the concertina wire the unit had stretched across the road and continued into the platoon area inside the cordon. A warning shot was fired, and the vehicle increased speed. The patrol fired multiple weapons into the windshield of the vehicle, which eventually crashed into a light pole. Occupants began exiting the vehicle and yelling in Arabic. The interpreter, [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) told the patrol that the occupants were Iraqi Police (out of uniform in unmarked car). The other IPs on the scene confirmed their identity and evacuated the wounded in the vehicle. The shooting of the Iraqi Police was not reported in Serious Incident Report or duty log. (Tabs U, [REDACTED], [REDACTED])

The air support declined to target the house with [REDACTED] and left. The pilots aborted the requested [REDACTED] strike based on the proximity of houses next to the [REDACTED]. Attack air departed the AO. (Tab C, [REDACTED], K, [REDACTED])

(6) Clear the house mission planning:

Escalation of Force

Initial report of contact was at 2109 hours, lasting until approximately 2116 hours. Over an hour later, at 2243, the assault starts on the [REDACTED]. (Tab B)

The Platoon Leader's initial plan was to destroy the house with a [REDACTED] from an Apache. At this point, the patrol did not know who was in the house, except for the IPs claim that they had taken fire from the rooftop of the house. No direct fire was ever observed coming from the house, nor any contact made with anyone inside. (Tab K, [REDACTED] J, [REDACTED])

The Company Commander attempted to acquire the air mission to destroy the house with a [REDACTED]. Pilots and 6-8 CAV denied the mission due to the proximity of the neighboring houses. 6-8 CAV's S3 directed the company commander to have the patrol clear the house.

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The two Squad Leaders developed a plan to "Clear" the house that the IPs had pointed out. SSG [redacted] and SSG [redacted] developed the plan for clearing the house after conferring with the interpreter, [redacted] and the IPs that were initially on the scene. Both Squad Leaders convinced the Platoon Leader, 2LT [redacted], that insurgents were in the house, and the IPs had identified the house. (Tab K, [redacted] J, [redacted] N, [redacted])

His first course of action was to clear the house using [redacted] from attack aviation. The pilots denied the mission based on proximity of houses next to the [redacted]. After at least an one to two hours from the time of the last enemy fire, 2LT [redacted] approved, "100%", the course of action presented to him by his two squad leaders, SSG [redacted] and SSG [redacted]. That plan was to have a HMMWV crash through the exterior wall and gate, fire medium machine gunfire (M240B) at the upper story of the house, throw a fragmentation grenade into the courtyard of the house, and send in a dismounted clearing team. This plan did not address actions for non-combatant civilians that might have been in the house.

The BCT TOCSOP defines the tactical definition of clear: Task: "CLEAR": Clear (Army) - 1. A tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned area. (BCT TACSOP). Many of the platoon members did not understand what the task meant in relation to civilians, since it was never discussed. 2LT [redacted] said he never briefed the company commander on his plan prior to clearing the house. (Tab K, [redacted] J, [redacted] N, [redacted] A, [redacted])

The Platoon Leader approved the recommended plan devised by his two squad leaders:

- Breach the outer wall to the house by crashing a HMMWV through the gate/wall.
- Warn occupants by having the interpreter yell for them to come out.
- Suppress the 2nd story of the house by firing the mounted M240B Machine Gun at the windows and roof.
- Establish a stack of Soldiers at the entrance made by the HMMWV
- Throw a fragmentation grenade in the courtyard
- Assault the house to "clear" any insurgents in the house (Tab K, [redacted])

The platoon leader ([redacted]) and squad leader ([redacted]) stated that no plan was made for the possibility of noncombatant civilians being in the house. The house was pointed out by the Iraqi Police to the interpreter, [redacted] as a location that they had received RPG and PKC fire from previously, from the rooftop. This was interpreted to SSG [redacted] and SSG [redacted], who in turn, briefed 2LT [redacted]. 2LT [redacted] made the assumption that insurgents were in the house, and did not consider or brief a plan for non-combatant civilians in the house. At no time, did Soldiers from the platoon witness anyone entering the house, nor did they receive any enemy fire from the house at any time. (Tab K, [redacted] J, [redacted] N, [redacted])

(7) The Verbal Warning:

Soldiers and the company commander's statements describe the interpreter ([redacted]) as yelling a warning to occupants numerous times to come out. The commander states: The Interpreter, [redacted] 62 ([redacted]), which is the name of another interpreter and not [redacted], "yelled out twice for everyone to come out with their hands in the air". [redacted] stated that he only yelled twice, both from the far western corner, 2 houses away from the [redacted], to not come out. He wanted people to stay in their homes throughout the neighborhood. His last warning was "Americans coming in" just prior to the HMMWV crashing the wall. [redacted] states that no warning was given in Arabic during the suppressive fire from the [redacted], the grenade, or the dismounted assault. In fact, [redacted] states that he did not go in with the first clearing team stack, but waited and went in with the second team. (Tab K, [redacted] J, [redacted] N, [redacted] L, [redacted])

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(8) Clear the House:

SSGs [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] briefed the members of their squads who would provide the breach vehicle, suppressive fire, and assault teams for the mission. Unique to the stack teams formed, was the composition. Two squad leaders would be in the same stack, comprised of various Soldiers. This was not a fire team or squad that habitually cleared rooms together, but a task organized team based on who was available from each of the vehicles. MAJ [REDACTED] 6-8 CAV S3, stated that the 6-8 CAV TOC was not receiving reports from A/1-184 IN. 6-8 CAV was ordered by the Brigade Commander to send a field grade officer to the site, since the Brigade TOC was receiving inadequate reporting on the situation. (Tab K, [REDACTED]; J, [REDACTED]; N, [REDACTED] C, [REDACTED])

(9) Search:

A search was conducted of the house, locating a pistol in the bedroom. No shell casings were found in the house or on the roof. MAJ [REDACTED] found a rubber eyepiece on the roof. Although 158 digital photographs were taken of the bodies, vehicles, and articles found in the street and in the house, not a single picture was taken showing the rooftop of the [REDACTED] house, or the rubber eyepiece found by MAJ [REDACTED]. CPT [REDACTED] states that "on the roof a RPG rubber eyepiece was found, with hundreds of spent 7.62 shell casings". Soldiers' statements from the scene state that no shell casings were found on the roof. In fact, they found nothing on the roof, using white light to ensure they thoroughly searched the roof to account for all evidence. MAJ [REDACTED] states that he personally finds the eyecup, on the roof, where the unit had reported taking RPG fire." The unit never did report taking RPG, or small-arms fire from the house. (Tabs A, C, U)

(10) Assessment of Civilian Casualties:

None of the five KIA LN bodies had small arms weapons, or RPGs. The four bodies in the street were most likely killed during 3d Platoon's lead element's engagement returning fire, as well as by the Iraqi Police who later came up on the vehicles, although inconclusive based on interviews and statements. The company duty log does list an estimated 2 KIA for this engagement. All tested positive for [REDACTED], although none were found. The body inside the house did not have a weapon, and tested positive for [REDACTED]. SSG [REDACTED] shot the KIA LN inside the house, who later died in the house while medics worked on him. (Tabs J, F, B, Q)

(11) Reporting Discrepancies:

Reporting of significant events during and following the incident was not in accordance with the BCT TACSOP, nor Commander's Critical Information Requirements reporting guidance from multiple FRAGOs. MAJ [REDACTED] and CPT [REDACTED] reports to the BCT TOC, and statements written in the Company Commander's Memorandum for Record, and the 6-8 CAV FM report contain many discrepancies compared to sworn statements taken from Platoon members immediately following the incident. Discrepancies identified are listed below:

KIA #5 in house: S3, 6/8 CAV report says the man in the house was killed by suppressive fire. (Tab C, [REDACTED])

Fire from the house: MAJ [REDACTED] asked CPT [REDACTED] if they were still taking fire from the house, and CPT [REDACTED] replied, No. (Statements show that the platoon never did take fire from the house) (Tab C)

MAJ [REDACTED] states that he found an RPG eyecup on his roof, where the unit had reported taking RPG fire. (The unit never took RPG fire from the house, soldiers thought the eyepiece was part of night vision goggles, the interpreter said it looked like part of an RPG. None of the soldiers found anything on the roof while looking with white light for shell casings. MAJ [REDACTED] states that he found the eyecup on the roof after arriving 30 minutes after the search). (Tab C)

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MAJ ██████ states that "at first, I was afraid we had killed a civilian. Though he was unarmed, his skin tested positive for explosives residue and gunpowder (pink and black hot)". (However, SGT ██████ who tested all five of the KIA, stated that the man in the house only tested positive for explosives residue. The man had also just received the effects of a hand grenade bursting in the front courtyard, penetrating windows in the house and possibly wounding him and his daughter. It is reasonable to assume that the man would have some explosive residue on his person. Photographs also show the man's hands as blood stained, which may indicate that he touched some of his shrapnel wounds, or had his hands injured themselves from the hand-grenade blast). (Tabs C, Q, F)

In CPT ██████ statement, he mentions that they (3d PLT) continued to receive RPK and AK47 fire from Ms. ██████ (WIA female) home. He also states that attempts to neutralize them with small arms and M240B fire was unsuccessful, and 3rd PLT was unable to maneuver on the house without sustaining casualties. (All statements from the platoon confirm that fire was never seen, nor heard, coming from the target house.) (Tabs A; J, K, L, M, O, Q, S, W)

5. Findings:

The killing of one local national male and wounding of one local national female were the result of Soldiers in 3d Platoon, A Company, 1-184 IN (attached to 6-8 CAV) using disproportional force on a house where the enemy was not positively identified, nor non-combatants considered.

The killing of four males (identity unknown) was the direct result of combat action. Initial contact reported at 01 2109 MAR 05 by 3d PLT, A CO with insurgents, and subsequent contact with Iraqi Police with those same insurgents resulted in 4 males KIA. Proper battle drills were executed by the dismounted element and the mounted crews to enemy small-arms fire from probable insurgents (anti-iraqi forces) resulting in at least 2 enemy KIA witnessed by Soldiers in the platoon. The two other KIA males may have been killed by Iraqi Police, the 3d Platoon, or self-inflicted wounds from a detonating grenade pulled by the insurgents.

2LT ██████ did not follow the ROE in violation of UCMJ Article 92 – Failure to obey order or regulation. 2LT ██████ failed to follow the ROE in that he did not positively identify the target. The ROE requires "military operations against Iraq will be conducted, in so far as possible, to ensure that incidental injury to civilians and collateral damage to civilian objects are minimized". 2LT ██████ failed to ensure "the use of force to accomplish authorized missions will be necessary and proportional, that is, reasonable in intensity, duration and magnitude." (Tab 4-6, K)

SSG ██████ failed to follow the Rules of Engagement (TAB 5) in violation of UCMJ Article 92 – Failure to obey order or regulation and Article 119 - Manslaughter. SSG ██████ demonstrated culpable negligence in failing to ensuring that incidental injury to civilians and collateral damage to civilian objects was minimized. His plan presented to the platoon leader did not address actions toward non-combatants or the fact that some may actually be in the house. His only focus was the possible insurgents in the house, which he never saw, nor received fire from before entering the house. In each of the cases of de-escalating weapons effects chosen by SSG ██████, each was capable of having deadly effects on any non-combatants in the house. He started with allowing his platoon leader to proceed with the ██████ request and having soldiers mark the building with gunfire. He briefed the driver and gunner of the HMMWV that rammed the gate/wall and fired 250-300 rounds of 7.62 mm Machine Gun rounds across the 2nd story windows and wall. He personally threw the handgrenade into the courtyard, with blast effects shattering windows and sending shrapnel into the house. SSG ██████ shot an unarmed man in the back with multiple rounds from his M4, through a window, prior to the clearing team entering

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the house. The man later died of wounds. SSG [REDACTED] admitted that he could not see the man's hands, and did not see a weapon. [REDACTED] contradicts himself in his two statements. The earlier statement says the man was running towards the door. His later statement says that the man was standing by the door with his back to him, turned and looked at him when he called out, and turned back around. SSG [REDACTED] states that he believes the man was imposing a threat to the Soldiers at the door and fired at least one shot, but members of the platoon state multiple shots were fired. No one in the stack admits to seeing the man, nor SSG [REDACTED] shoot him. (Tab J, O)

CPT [REDACTED] failed to use due care and analysis of the situation prior to requesting attack aviation for a hellfire missile engagement on a house, in which occupants were not positively identified. Collateral damage of non-combatants and neighboring houses was not a consideration in the plan. 2LT [REDACTED] did not brief CPT [REDACTED] (Tab K)

CPT [REDACTED] failed to impart his intent for the task of clearing the house to LT [REDACTED] to ensure that the ROE and escalation of force were followed. CPT [REDACTED] states that "The Soldiers unequivocally followed their ROE and the escalation of force utilizing senior NCOs and an Officer to control fires in this situation in a potentially dangerous and threatening situation." However, his first course of action was to use the most casualty producing and most collateral damage causing weapon system in a dense urban neighborhood without being on the ground to see the situation. He did not demand an accurate report from his subordinate on civilian proximity to the planned strike location. He also did not receive the plan from his subordinate for approval prior to execution of the clearing mission. (Tab A, Tab K)

6. Recommendations:

CPT [REDACTED]

General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for Failure to Obey Order or Regulation
Relief for Cause from command position

2LT [REDACTED]

General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for Failure to Obey Order or Regulation
Relief for Cause from Platoon Leader position

SSG [REDACTED]

General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for Failure to Obey Order or Regulation
and Involuntary Manslaughter
Relief for Cause from Squad Leader position
Bar to Reenlistment

A Company, 1-184 IN:

Retraining on ROE and use of force
Retrain TOC officers, NCOs and Soldiers on SIR and reporting procedures

MAJ [REDACTED] Counseling on conduct of investigation and SIR requirements

[REDACTED]
LTC, IN
DCO, 4th BDE, 3d ID

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
CALIFORNIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
Company A, 1-184 INF (AASLT)



Camp [REDACTED]
Iraq, APO AE [REDACTED]

CALL-ES-A

8 MAR 05

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: COLATERAL INJURY OF FEMALE IN MUHALLAH [REDACTED]

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to outline the findings of my commander's inquiry surrounding the facts and circumstances of a minimal injury (superficial lacerations) of a non-combatant 21 y/o female, Ms. [REDACTED] during a combat patrol on 01 Mar 2005 while conducting a house clearing in [REDACTED] vic. [REDACTED], ([REDACTED]) during a fire fight that was initiated by insurgents using her house for cover. *Khanou Nuisabab*

2. During the course of 3rd platoon's patrol this evening, Lt [REDACTED] had them dismount in [REDACTED] just North of [REDACTED] Road IOT get the 10 digit grid of a burned out vehicle (PIR) on [REDACTED] St (going East Bound). As they rounded the corner of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] St. the lead elements of his patrol received heavy AK47 fire from the South vic [REDACTED]. 3rd Plt returned fire, and withdrew to the South West Corner of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to engage the enemy from their flanks. Upon arrival to that area, 3rd Plt linked up with area IP who had been caught in an ambush (1 dead, 1 wounded IP) until 3rd PLT arrived. They continued to receive RPK and AK47 fire from Ms. [REDACTED] home. Attempts to neutralize them with small arms and M240B fire was unsuccessful, and 3rd PLT was unable to maneuver on the house without sustaining casualties. Lt [REDACTED], (3rd PLT PL) requested and initially received CAS to subdue the hostilities. However, it was evident from the pilots description of the target, that it was not a clear shot, and the chance for collateral or [REDACTED] Force casualties were to high for [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]. Subsequently, I received the order from [REDACTED] (6/8 Cav S3-Major [REDACTED]) to maneuver on the [REDACTED] and take it with ground forces. With the arrival of a QRF force, led by 1LT [REDACTED] from the power plant, the soldiers were now able to fire and maneuver to the house without great risk. The enemy fire had subsided, and they assaulted with a vehicle to crash the gate. The Interpreter, [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) *← release*, yelled out twice for everyone inside to come out with their hands in the air. After a two minute warning the PL gave the ok to utilize a fragmentary hand grenade in the courtyard to shock and subdue the occupants inside the house. The grenade was thrown 10 meters from the block wall house. They assaulted the house shortly after the explosion with the cover of suppressive fire and discovered one nearly fatal AIF (her father), and Ms. [REDACTED]. The AIF died shortly after, despite heroic attempts by the

Nuisabab

Medic, SGT [REDACTED] to perform life saving measures. She initially had no complaints of injury, but after questioning from the Medics (to include SPC [REDACTED] and SPC [REDACTED] on the scene, they discovered superficial lacerations to the left foot and thigh. She agreed to medical treatment, and the soldiers adequately and appropriately bandaged the female's wounds. Afterwards, she requested to wait next door at the neighbors house with her money and gold. The request was granted and she ambulated independently (escorted) to the neighbor's house. After the IP arrived, they had their EMS persons reassess the female. It is our understanding the female refused further medical care at the time. The subsequent search of the house produced information linking the AIF member as a Bath Union Boss and a 9mm. On the roof a RPG rubber eye piece was found, and hundreds of spent 7.62 shell casings.

3. The Soldiers unequivocally followed their ROE and the escalation of force utilizing senior NCOs and an Officer to control fires in this situation in a potentially dangerous and threatening situation. The soldiers believed they were engaging a potential AIF team size element with AK47s/RPKs/RPGs that threatened our soldiers and fit the description of what the IPs had seen in the past hour, which had engaged both of the [REDACTED] elements. The female was not an intended target, and it was not certain how she was injured, (she stated that she did not know, and there was no clear medical evidence). Due to the fact that we found no contraband on her, and we do not believe she was directly supporting AIF, we recommend solatial payment to her for any routine medical care that may have occurred after the incident, and no further action.

4. POC for this memo is CPT. [REDACTED] (MCI)

[REDACTED]
CPT, IN, CAARNG
Commanding

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent of this form is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately recorded
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION CP [REDACTED], BAGHDAD, IRAQ	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2005-06-19	3. TIME 1304	4. FILE NUMBER unknown
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]	6. SSN [REDACTED]	7. GRADE/STATUS CPT/COMMANDING	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS CO. A, 1/184 IN, 4 TH BDE, 3 RD ID			

9.

I, [REDACTED] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

SGT [REDACTED] joined our unit late in our mobilization process in Donna Ana, Texas. It may have been November, 2004. He was assigned as a Machine Gunner in First Platoon, because all the team leader slots in my company were full. On approximately 20 Jan 2005, I decided to replace SGT [REDACTED] (who was relieved of his deployment duties secondary to father's death) with SGT [REDACTED]. Thus he became the B TL in 2nd SQD, 3rd PLT under SSG [REDACTED], who reports to LT [REDACTED] (3rd PLT PL). At the time we had just gotten to Kuwait. I understand that before long, SGT [REDACTED] became disgruntled with SSG [REDACTED] for reasons unknown to me. These issues became more ripe with rifle as we performing our Left seat Right seat ride with B 1/8 CAV. We officially took over our mission 27 Feb 2005 in [REDACTED].

On 1 Mar 05 we experienced our biggest gun battle to date. It lasted nearly 2 hours from beginning to end as I recall. 3rd PLT was on a ISR mission (new to this sector- trying to establish a the routes in the [REDACTED]). They came to a stop to get the Grid Coordinate of a vehicle that was abandoned near the Eastern corner of [REDACTED] (EAW ST) and [REDACTED] (N/S St). When they dismounted they received heavy gun fire. Evidently they had drove into a AIF ambush for the IPs. The IPs were getting shot up on the corner of [REDACTED] Road and [REDACTED] ST in [REDACTED]. LT [REDACTED] maneuvered his forces to the IPs on [REDACTED] Road. They returned fire at the insurgents at the [REDACTED] in question. Considering there were two IPs wounded from this house, and lots of gun fire (AK 47s/RPGs etc), the PL had called in CAS, and the 6/8 CAV gave us the initial green light to shoot the target. I believe that order was rescinded by Brigade. I was given orders to seize the home with ground forces instead. I gave those orders to the PL over the radio, then proceeded to move to the scene. There was a bout a one hour lag between when we first called in CAS and the assault on the house. When I arrived they were taking the house. I had just conducted a linkup with an outer cordon team when they entered the house 100 M away- so unfortunately I did not see the incident. I did see a the bloody aftermath though of the gun battle. There were 5 AIF killed that night, who had Hand grenades, AKs rounds (everywhere, up and down [REDACTED] ST, in the yards), Radios, Glocks, and RPG eye parts that we found. In all, it was a very confusing scene. We had 2-3 blood trails of insurgents who fled (that we could not find). There were hundreds of spent AK rounds everywhere, but no AKs (I concluded taken during the 1 hour lag it took to assault the house).

On the last surge to oust insurgents from the [REDACTED] ^{house}, they cordoned the house and called out twice (v/a interpreter) to come out of the house - hands up. Neither time did they respond. The PL gave the green light and the fire a M240 for covering fire at the top of the roof where the insurgents had shot at them. Then they lobbed a grenade into the court yard to shock and suppress the insurgents. SSG [REDACTED] led the assault team in. He shot a person who deemed hostile, as they went in. The man, a 27 year Baptist of the highest ranks, subsequently died. Because the man was unarmed when shot, this concerned everyone. Thus when asked why he had perceived the man a risk, it was explained to me by SSG [REDACTED] that he was charging the door, and all the fire they were taking from the house he felt greatly at risk. Considering all the factors: the darkness (low illum), the smoke/explosion from the grenade, the adrenalin, the fire from the house, it is reasonable to assume when a man was charging the door during entry, that he was a threat. Thus I accepted his explanation as justified, and I believe that Major [REDACTED] who was on the scene with me (6/8 CAV S-3) did as well. We spent a lot of time photographing the evidence, insurgents etc.

I took several days to collect sworn statements and interview key leaders who were in the fight, and soldiers that participated. I do not remember ever speaking to SGT [REDACTED] specifically about the incident, as he was neither a shooter or a key leader. However, I did do a formal AAR after I had gotten all the facts. I discussed the key points with all present, and took informal comments. I do not believe SGT [REDACTED] participated in discussion, but was present. Key Points I remember pressing was Salute reports, using CAS (or when not to) and pressing the battle (do not let the enemy have to escape). I thought that the Platoon had learned some valuable lessons about two way engagements. No one mentioned any unresolved issues.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE <u>1</u> OF <u>2</u> PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF _____ CPT _____ TAKEN AT FOB _____ DATED 19 June 2005

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

In the weeks that followed, it was mentioned to me by the PL (LT _____) that SGT _____ and SGT _____ were troubled by the happenings of that night. I thought about sending them to Chaplain _____, but he had already talked with them. Considering SGT _____ is an atheist (I am told), I thought maybe a more Humanistic approach would be beneficial. I suggest that we do another AAR, led by the 1SG, so that any residual misgivings or misunderstandings could come out. I believe this was conducted on 1 APRIL 05. I was told that everyone felt better afterwards.

I recommended that if that if anyone wanted to come speak to me they could. I am not sure why they did not, but it never occurred. I have an open door policy, and many soldiers have used it. I was later told by SGT _____ (on May 30th) that he did not approach me because of his "former Marine training- and they do not involve higher ups".

On April 5th an IED blast at the Sonics Nursery occurred killing CPL _____ and wounding 4 others (SGT _____, SGT _____, SSG _____, and SPC _____). This triggered a subsequent search of Nursery on April 6th by an volunteer patrol. SGT _____ alleges that SSG _____ was involved in Detainee abuse that day. SGT _____ was not on the patrol. No one else on that patrol has confirmed any of those allegations to me up to this point, and have denied all vehemently. This includes SFC _____, SSG _____, SGT _____, and SGT _____ (who SGT _____ quoted as the source). SGT _____ made those allegations to me on 30 May 05. I talked to all prime witnesses by 31 May 05, and got sworn statements from SGT _____, and SGT _____ denying the allegations.

On May 29th there was an incident involving SGT _____'s vehicle. The radios had been programmed for QRF mission by SPC _____. However, when they went to roll out later, the radios had been "Z'd" out. This is a deliberate act, and SGT _____ was convinced somebody had "done it to him" to make him look bad. It concerned me, and I initiated an informal inquiry. However, the facts that came out were unexpected: 1) SGT _____ hates his squad leader SSG _____ 2) SGT _____ wants to see SSG _____ dead, would not cry a tear if he died, and would like a slow firey death 3) SGT _____ has such disdain for the Iraqis, he yells fuck you to the waving children as they drive past them in the streets 4) SGT _____ calls his soldiers "Man Tits", "Summer Sausage", "Dirty Wet", "Big Gay AI" (a homosexual character from the TV series "South Park") 5) SGT _____'s patterns of abuse had increased significantly in the two weeks prior to May 30th, and his soldiers fear him 6) SGT _____ physically dominated other soldiers by blocking them, pushes and shoves 7) SGT _____ admitted to most or all of it to me and 1SG _____.

As far as the radio was concerned, I never found out who "Z'd" them out, but think it was a matter of a simple mistaken identity (vehicle wise).

He stated that the reason he hated SSG _____ was what happened on mar 1st, and that Apr 6th was a pattern. I asked what he meant by April 6th and told em he thought SSG _____ beat up a detainee and used a Taser to his face. I asked why, and he said SGT _____ saw it. I talked to SGT _____, key participants as referred to above. I found no truth in the allegations.

During other discussions with him: on March 1st, I tried to explain to him the fog of war, and put himself in SSG _____'s boots. He told me that he felt better, and he understood after we talked. The only thing that bothered him was SSG _____'s lack of remorse. I explained that often times we do not express openly what is in our hearts, and that is especially so when dealing with your subordinates. I also stated that was between him and his wife (I personally think it is between him and God, but knowing his background worded it differently).

I proceeded to initiate counseling (conducted by 1sg _____), research UCMJ alternatives, replaced him with my RTO - CPL _____, and referred him to Major _____ for anger management. I also had him see the Chaplain because of the significance of his issues. It was only after all this was brought up, and that punishment was looming that he decided to go after his squad leader, and accuse him of all these horrible acts (murder /Taser abuse etc). I had placed him in the CP for radio watch to keep him from being in charge of troops/out on patrol. When LTC _____ got word of his accusations via LTC _____ (BN Surgeon who was seeing him instead of Maj _____). Even though all his accusation were unsubstantiated (from ALL the evidence I have reviewed) or was a matter of his opinion, or heresay not backed up, the BC still decided to go forward and investigate for purposes of righteousness. Subsequently he was transferred to HHC. He then wrote up his allegations at the direction of LTC _____.

It is my opinion that considering the circumstances of when these allegations being made (soldier under scrutiny, 3 months later), and the acts of SSG _____ under combat (everyone of them had a high probability of being shot dead going in that door), I feel that we are investigating the wrong soldier.

I wanted it to be recorded that I believe SGT _____ still needs some sort of psycho-social rehabilitative work, and at a minimum anger management training. To my knowledge he has not gotten any help yet, voluntary or directed.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] TAKEN AT Baghdad Iraq DATED 19 June, 2005

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Nothing Follows

AFFADAVIT

I [REDACTED] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Making the Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 19 day of Jun 2005 at

WITNESSES:

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED] LTC, IN
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority to Administer Oath)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[REDACTED]



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
4TH BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 3D INFANTRY DIVISION
FOB [REDACTED] BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO AE [REDACTED]

AFZP-VE-C

MEMORANDUM FOR CAP [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Restricted Communications

1. With the exception of appointed investigative officer(s); CID, and/or legal personnel, you are to have no discussions of any nature pertaining to the issues that are the subject of this investigation, specifically the allegations of misconduct surrounding the events of 1 March 2005. The term "discussions" includes any and all means of communication, to include, but not limited to, verbal, telephonic, electronic, and written communication. This term further includes having any of your associates conduct or attempting to conduct communications by any means (physically, telephonically, or electronically) on your behalf. If anyone communicates or attempts to communicate to any other party pertaining to these issues and it is determined that you were in any way involved, you will be held accountable for your conduct.
2. If anyone communicates or attempts to communicate to any other party pertaining to these issues and you have knowledge or become aware of such efforts you are required to report the incident to the investigating officer and/or legal personnel. Failure to report such an incident will be considered as failure to follow a lawful order and you will be held accountable for your conduct.
3. You are to conduct no actions of an investigative nature into these issues. Should you be contacted by anyone other than an appointed investigative officer, CID, or legal regarding these issues, that person or persons should be referred to the investigating officer and/or legal personnel.
4. This order is not imposed as punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but issued as an administrative measure to facilitate the neutral and detached execution of on-going investigations.

[REDACTED]
LTC, IN
Deputy Commander

PAIROL MANIFEST

Vehicle bumper #:			Vehicle bumper #:		
Name	Sensitive Item	Serial Number	Name	Sensitive Item	Serial Number
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]			

PLT: HQ
DTG SP: 6605
PMCS/QAQC/DISPATCH:
Purpose of mission: TP Station

Gnd: [REDACTED]
ETR: [REDACTED]

Patrol # 010

Patrol # 0172

[REDACTED] A12
[REDACTED] A12
[REDACTED] A12
[REDACTED] A12
[REDACTED] A22
[REDACTED] A22
[REDACTED] A22
[REDACTED] (CO)
[REDACTED] C37
[REDACTED] A22
[REDACTED] A21
[REDACTED] A21
[REDACTED] A21
[REDACTED] A21
[REDACTED] A22
[REDACTED] A21
[REDACTED] A12

[REDACTED]
SGT. [REDACTED]
SPC [REDACTED]
SPS [REDACTED]
SPC [REDACTED]
SGT [REDACTED]

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION		LOCATION		PERIOD COVERED			
co 1/184 imp [redacted]		FOB [redacted]		FROM		TO	
ITEM NO.	TIME	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.				ACTION TAKEN	INL
	IN	OUT	HOUR	DATE	HOUR	DATE	
1	0001		0001	1 Mar 05	2400	1 March 05	
2	1232						
3	1212						
4	1252						
5	0108						
6	0149						
7	0158						
8	0311						
9	0505						
10	0555						

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY

SIGNATURE

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION		LOCATION		PERIOD COVERED			
A Co 1/184 TH INF		FOB [REDACTED]		FROM		TO	
A [REDACTED]				HOUR	DATE	HOUR	DATE
				0001	1 Mar 05	2400	1 March 05
ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL		
	IN	OUT					
11	0610		[REDACTED] ARRIVES AT POWER PLANT TO PICK UP INTERPOL -	LOGGED	[REDACTED]		
12	0650		[REDACTED] FROM POWER PLANT, heading to RT [REDACTED]	Logged	[REDACTED]		
13	0700		[REDACTED] relieves [REDACTED] for cadets	Logged	[REDACTED]		
14	0730		white P11 truck on fire reported by [REDACTED] @ [REDACTED]	BAW said to bypass	[REDACTED]		
15	0742		SITREP GOING PAST [REDACTED] GOING E ON [REDACTED]	Logged	[REDACTED]		
16	0745		[REDACTED] advised to contact [REDACTED] when doing dismantled patrols on RT [REDACTED]	Logged	[REDACTED]		
17	0831		[REDACTED] is at Grid [REDACTED] they did a couple of vehicle searches nothing came up.	called in sitrep	[REDACTED]		
18	0859		[REDACTED] is back in route to the power plant from Grid [REDACTED]	Logged	[REDACTED]		
19	0912		[REDACTED] advised of all the soldiers involve in last night's incident must have a sworn statement in to BAI by 1100 hrs.	Logged	[REDACTED]		
20	1009		[REDACTED] Request Air cover due to Raid: Human Intel said people are being executed at vic Grid [REDACTED]	called BA	[REDACTED]		
21	1017		[REDACTED] Finds one pistol and will continue to the other 7 houses	called BA	[REDACTED]		
22	1100		[REDACTED] LEFT POWER PLANT FOR FOB PATROL # 015B ENTER/EXIT FOB T	called BA	[REDACTED]		

NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY

SIGNATURE

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION		LOCATION		PERIOD COVERED			
4 Co 1/184 TH INF		FOB [REDACTED]		FROM		TO	
				HOUR	DATE	HOUR	DATE
				0001	1 MAR 05	2100	1 MAR 05
NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL		
	IN	OUT					
22	1145		[REDACTED] RELAYED PATROL 0157 P/V INTERPRETER PATROL 0155 DROP OFF INTERPRETER [REDACTED]	RELAYED TO [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
23	1145		[REDACTED] RETURNS TO FOB GREEN GREEN ARRIVES AT FOB	CALLED W/ [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
24	1230 1230		Power plant reports possible explosion from [REDACTED] IED, 2 clicks south west of [REDACTED]	Called Bat.	[REDACTED]		
25	1329		[REDACTED] Inquiries about explosion near power plant Power plant reports no evidence of explosion	Logged	[REDACTED]		
26	1345		reports gas can on side of [REDACTED] of ROAD @ [REDACTED] possible IED (0160)	Logged	[REDACTED]		
27	1600		[REDACTED] call for all temp pay sheet TURN IN by 1800 to [REDACTED]	Relay message to [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
28	1652		PAY SHEET TURN IN FOR TERPS WAS PUSHED BACK UNTIL 2 MAR 05 1300	LOGGED	[REDACTED]		
29	1658		[REDACTED] requested 100% accountability for personnel	Relay to All killer Element, 100%	[REDACTED]		
30	1859 1730		SFC [REDACTED] took the key for the connector	Logged	[REDACTED]		
31	1903		[REDACTED] element SP on Patrol 0170 at 1901 taking 5 vehicles 19 soldiers 1 temp.	Called Bat	[REDACTED]		
32	1915		Possible IED found on [REDACTED] grid [REDACTED]	Notify Power Plant / [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
33	1922		Power Plant saw 2 RPG's and small arms fire - 1000 meters from grid [REDACTED] at 1000 meters at 265° magnetic from tower Saw vehicle driving crazy, no description of vehicle	notified BN	[REDACTED]		
34	1956		IED on [REDACTED] exploded no injuries		[REDACTED]		
35	2008		[REDACTED] started IED at [REDACTED]	notified BN	[REDACTED]		

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY _____ SIGNATURE _____

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG

For use of this form, see AR 220-15; the proponent agency is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans

PAGE NO.

NO. OF PAGES

4

4

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION

A 1/154 INF

LOCATION

Fob [REDACTED]

PERIOD COVERED

FROM

TO

HOUR

DATE

HOUR

DATE

0001

1 Mar 05

2400

1 Mar 05

ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL
	IN	OUT			
36	2109		[REDACTED] receiving small arms fire at Grid [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Blue has expanded over 100 mts already.	called BN	[REDACTED]
37	2116		[REDACTED] est. 2 Enemy KIA received RPG Small Arms from Building requesting close Air support	call BN	[REDACTED]
38	2119		[REDACTED] QRF linked up with [REDACTED]	logged.	[REDACTED]
39	2225		[REDACTED] MADE DECISION TO ROLL ON SCENE HIMSELF		
40	2230		[REDACTED] LEAVES FOB WITH [REDACTED]		
41	2243		[REDACTED] ENTER'S BUILDING 1 ENEMY CASUALTY		
42	2245		1 MALE 2 FEMALES 1 WOUNDED MEDIC IS WORKING ON WOUNDED		
43	2258		1 K.I.A IRAQI (MALE)		
44	2300		IP ENROUTE TO LOCATION.		
45	2400		LOG CLOSED OUT	LOGGED	[REDACTED]

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY

SIGNATURE

Trip Ticket 3rd platoon Section 2 Grey

1/3/2005 0600 SP

Grade	Unit	Rank	Weapon	N.O.D.J.	C.C.O./A.C.O.G.	Piqd/Paq2	Blood Type	Misc	VEH
Sgt.	[REDACTED]	IAP6661	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	072501	N/A	A+		A31
Sgt.	[REDACTED]	IAR7056	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	072556	0774698	A+		A31
Spc.	[REDACTED]	IAT8960	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	072571	0775638	A+		A31
Spc.	[REDACTED]	IAG4848	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	072565	0774028	O+		A31
Spc.	[REDACTED]	IAP6504	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	N/A	N/A	A+		A31
Sgt.	[REDACTED]	IAG7510	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	072485	N/A	O+		A21
Spc.	[REDACTED]	IAG7963	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	N/A	N/A	O+		A21
Spc.	[REDACTED]	IAM9728	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	072561	N/A	O+		A21
Pvt.	[REDACTED]	IAM3849	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	072503	0773658	B+		A21
Sgt.	[REDACTED]	IAP5988	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	083718	077306	B+		A11
Sgt.	[REDACTED]	IAD1312	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	540595	0776118	O+		A11
Spc.	[REDACTED]	IAG5490	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	72577	N/A	O+		A11
Spc.	[REDACTED]	IAL2529	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	N/A	0776060	A+		C37
Spc.	[REDACTED]	IAM7053	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	04-29889	N/A	O+		A11
Sgt.	[REDACTED]	IAM7981	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	63732	0775408	O+		C37
Spc.	[REDACTED]	IAC833	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	69850	N/A	B+		C37
Sfc.	[REDACTED]	IAM0064	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	67001	0775358	O+		C37
Sgt.	[REDACTED]	IASC092	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	N/A	N/A	A+		C37
Sgt.	[REDACTED]	IAM2142	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	92239	N/A	A+	1144536	A11

ALL

	NAME	BR#	M4#	WPN	TF ACC	184 IN	NVG	PAQ4/PEQ2	ACOG	RHINO/GPS
DR	[REDACTED]	IAL4270	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	PEQ2#067284A	69847	[REDACTED]
TC	[REDACTED]	IAC3021	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	PAQ4#077478B	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
GUNNER	[REDACTED]	IAL8644	M16#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	PAQ4#077598B	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
DISMOUNT	[REDACTED]	IAM8638	M4/203#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
DISMOUNT	[REDACTED]	IAM8638	M4#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	PAQ4#077247B	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Additional equipment on vehicle										
240B#2 SER#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Shotgun#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
M14#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

VIX#A2613

DR	[REDACTED]	IAB3864	M4#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	PVSTD#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
TC	[REDACTED]	IAC8150	M4#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	PVS14#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
GUNNER	[REDACTED]	IAC3304	M4#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	PVS14#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
DISMOUNT	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Additional equipment on vehicle										
M240B#1 SER#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Additional equipment on vehicle	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Plugger#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
M240#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
MGO#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
MGO#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

VIX#03715

DR	[REDACTED]	IAG1115	M4#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	PVS14#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
TC	[REDACTED]	IAP2016	M249#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	PVS14#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
GUNNER	[REDACTED]	IAT0709	M4/203#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	PVS14#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
DISMOUNT	[REDACTED]	IAG9597	M4#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	PVS14#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
DISMOUNT	[REDACTED]	IAM6143	M4#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	PVS14#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Additional equipment on vehicle										
Plugger#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
M240#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
MGO#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
MGO#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

VIX#A11

DR	[REDACTED]	IAN8597	M4#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	PVSTD#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
TC	[REDACTED]	IAM9824	M16A4#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	PVS14#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
GUNNER	[REDACTED]	IAM9382	M16A4#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	PVS14#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
DISMOUNT	[REDACTED]	IAC2700	M4/203#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	PVS14#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
DISMOUNT	[REDACTED]	IAC8757	M4#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	PVSTD#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Additional equipment on vehicle										
M240B#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
M14#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Shotgun#	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

ETR 0030
TOD 1900
Grid [REDACTED]

IAO 4635 A5

00209

PUS 14

M9

M49

IAA 6582 A3

M4

M68

PUS 7

Pa 04

CSIP

IAE 3241 A21

M4

M84

PUS 14

PUS 10

M68

Pa 04

M3

MYSLIC IA 1325

M4

M68

Pa 04

PUS 7

IMBDC

A31

[REDACTED] LTC 3ID 4BDE DCO

From: [REDACTED] MAJ 6/8 CAV S3
 Sent: Sunday, June 26, 2005 11:51 PM
 To: [REDACTED] LTC 3ID 4BDE DCO
 Subject: FW: 1 March 2005 (A/1-184 IN)

[REDACTED]

The following is from my portion of the unit history – it is similar to a journal. This is the entry that I made on 2 March for 1 March. I think it is what you inquired about. Due to the Iraqi training, I am normally not available until after 2100, but with the ceremony practice this week, I can free up some time. Does 0800 on Tuesday work?

v/r
 MAJ [REDACTED]

1 March, 2005

Last night, an AIF element attempted to ambush an Iraqi Police patrol with RPG and small arms fire just off of RTE [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] vic [REDACTED]. Coincidentally, our attached infantry company, A/1-184th IN was conducting a patrol moving South along an adjoining street just to the East of the street that the ambush was being conducted from. They reacted and moved towards the sound of the gunfire. Two AIF, apparently lookouts, were spotted and began firing almost simultaneously with [REDACTED] company's lead elements. The two AIF were shot down as two more AIF began firing from around the corner. [REDACTED] moved up alongside the side of the street and tossed a frag grenade around the corner. It was very effective, killing the two AIF. At the other end of the street, at least one Iraqi policeman was wounded and the others began to withdraw, evacuating the wounded. [REDACTED] Company prepared an assault force and rushed around the corner, firing as they went. They glimpsed at least two AIF fleeing around the far corner, withdrawing to the Northwest. They linked up with the IP's who pointed out the house that the firing was coming from. By this time, we had linked up two Apache Helicopters, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] who attempted to regain contact with the fleeing AIF. CPT [REDACTED] the A/1-84 commander requested to fire a [REDACTED] into the house. I asked if he was still taking fire from the house and he said "no". I told him that he could not fire the heavy weapons due to the close proximity of civilian residences (due to poor reporting, the TOC believed that the building was a high rise). It turned out to be a two story home. CPT [REDACTED] asked what he should do and I told him to enter and clear the building. It sounded like he was not too happy with the idea of sending his men into the home when he could have just as easily fired a [REDACTED]. His men opened fire, suppressing the home with 7.62 and 5.56 SAW and M4 fire before going in. The suppression fire killed a man, approximately 47 years old. Unlike the dead AIF in the streets, he was wearing the dishdasha that we soldiers like to call a man-dress. His daughter, about 20, was wounded in the foot and thigh. Because of the poor reporting, my commander had dispatched me with the QRF to go to the scene and send back a complete report. I arrived about 30 minutes after all firing had stopped. At first, I was afraid we had killed a civilian. Though he was unarmed, his skin tested positive for explosives residue and gunpowder (pink and black hot). Also, I found an RPG eyecup on his roof, where the unit had reported taking RPG fire. The withdrawing AIF had taken all the weapons with them, except for two pistols and one hand grenade that we found. However, the four dead AIF in the streets were lying in piles of expended AK shell casings and some had AK magazines in their pockets. It was a good night. 5 dead AIF and only one wounded civilian. One soldier from A/1-184th complained of ear pain because his earplug had fallen out just before the grenade was thrown.

6/27/2005

15485

6/8 CAV

01	01 MAR 05	1600	SSG [REDACTED] SPO [REDACTED] ASSUME TOC DUTIES	RECEIVED BRIEF	[REDACTED]
02	01 MAR 05	1610	[REDACTED] PATROL #0167 IS TAKING RT. [REDACTED] CHURCH/ BACK TO [REDACTED]	ACKNOWLEDGED	[REDACTED]
03	01 MAR 05	1615	PATROL UPDATE. A 1/184 (#0158) RTB 16° 0, C TRP (#0165) [REDACTED], E 2-16 (0160) [REDACTED], B 3-7 (0165) [REDACTED], E 2-16 (0166) SP'ING FROM OIL REF. TO FOB [REDACTED], [REDACTED] (0167) LO [REDACTED] YO [REDACTED] CHURCH/ [REDACTED]	ACKNOWLEDGED	[REDACTED]
04	01 MAR 05	1625	[REDACTED] SENDS UP GRN 3 GRN	ACKNOWLEDGED	[REDACTED]
05	01 MAR 05	1930	[REDACTED] REPORTS THAT PATROL 0158 HAS RETURNED TO THE POWER PLANT	ACKNOWLEDGED	[REDACTED]
06	01 MAR 05	1715	A, B, C, D, F, [REDACTED], B 3-7. SEND UP A 100% ACCOUNTIBILITY AND GRN 3 GRN	ACKNOWLEDGED	[REDACTED]
07	01 MAR 05	1908	[REDACTED] FOUND A BROWN BOX NEXT TO A TIRE W/ WIRES HANGING OUT OF IT. GRID IS [REDACTED] CALLED EOD WITH LINK UP GRID @ [REDACTED]	ACKNOWLEDGED	[REDACTED]
08	01 MAR 05	1915	[REDACTED] REPORTS OPEN TERRAIN @ IED	ACKNOWLEDGED	[REDACTED]
09	01 MAR 05	1919	[REDACTED] CALLS FOR NEW EOD, LINK UP GRID [REDACTED]	ACKNOWLEDGED	[REDACTED]
10	01 MAR 05	1820	[REDACTED] SENDS UP THAT TOWER RPG'S SAF @ GRID [REDACTED] AT M.A. OF 265° AT 1000	ACKNOWLEDGED	[REDACTED]
11	01 MAR 05	1953	[REDACTED] HEARS AN EXPLOSION @ [REDACTED] PATROL # 0165. DISMOUNTS ARE CONDUCTING AREA RECON OF EXPLOSION AREA. CALLED IT UP TO [REDACTED]	ACKNOWLEDGED	[REDACTED]
12	01 MAR 05	1956	EOD ON SCENE @ GRID [REDACTED]	ACKNOWLEDGED	[REDACTED]
13	01 MAR 05	2000	[REDACTED] REPORTS THAT PATROL 0170 IS AT THE POWER PLANT	ACKNOWLEDGED	[REDACTED]
14	01 MAR 05	2110	[REDACTED] A 1/184 ([REDACTED]) UNDER SAF CONTACT W/ RPG FROM ROOF TOPS @ [REDACTED]: (0) CASUALTIES-REQUEST CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. TARGETS MARKED W/ GRN LASER. [REDACTED] QRF ASSISTING [REDACTED] ON SQUADRON NET TALKING TO [REDACTED] ELEMENT	NOTIFIED BTL CPT	[REDACTED]
15	01 MAR 05	2130	[REDACTED] ADVISES THAT CONTROL DET. @ [REDACTED]	ACKNOWLEDGED	[REDACTED]
16	01 MAR 05	2135	[REDACTED] ADVISES THAT CONTROL DET. @ [REDACTED]	NOTIFIED BDE, ACKNOWLEDGE	[REDACTED]
17	01 MAR 05	2140	EOD LOCATED W/ [REDACTED] FOUND 2 ND IED DEVICE. CONTROL DET @ [REDACTED]	ACKNOWLEDGED	[REDACTED]
18	01 MAR 05	2235	[REDACTED] ADVISED CORDONED OFF HOUSE AND PREPARING TO ENTER @ [REDACTED] 30° MAG. 60 M DISTANCE AWAY	ACKNOWLEDGED	[REDACTED]
19	01 MAR 05	2250	SITREP FROM: [REDACTED]-ENTERED HOUSE, THREW FRAG GRENADE. ASSESSING SITUATION	ACKNOWLEDGED	[REDACTED]
20	01 MAR 05	2315	SITREP FROM: [REDACTED]-5 ENEMY KIA	ACKNOWLEDGED	[REDACTED]
21	01 MAR 05	2340	SITREP FROM: [REDACTED]-1 FEM. WIA, 5 ENEMY KIA, X SPRAYING INDIVIDUALS	ACKNOWLEDGED	[REDACTED]

6/8 CAV

22	01 MAR 05	2341	██████████ ADVISED CROSSING INTO OUR AO TO INVESTIGATE 3 VEH. FLASHING LIGHTS ON RAILROAD TRACKS @ ██████████	ADVISED BTL CPT	██████████
23	01 MAR 05	2346	██████████ (██████████) ADVISED REACHED LOCATION ██████████ ASSESSING SITUATION	ACKNOWLEDGED	██████████
24	01 MAR 05	2347	██████████ (██████████) ADVISED DETAINED 1 IND. CALLED IP TO P/U NC	ACKNOWLEDGED	██████████
25	01 MAR 05	2348	██████████ (1900) REPORTS ONE OF THEIR VEH. HIT AN IED @ ██████████ INT. OF ██████████ ANGRY CCNT. MISSION W/ NO INJURIES-EOD WILL NOT CONDUCT POST BLAST ANALYSIS	ADVISED BTL CPT	██████████
01	02 MAR 05	2400	SSG ██████████ PFC ██████████ RELIEVE SSG ██████████ AND SPC ██████████ OF TOC DUTIES	ASSUME DUTIES	██████████
02	02 MAR 05	0005	██████████ UPDATES GRID @ ██████████ FOR KIA'S, ██████████ ENROUTE	NOT'D BTL CPT	██████████
03	02 MAR 05	0015	██████████ REPORTS FRANTIC FIRE NORTH OF THEIR LOCATION	NOT'D M3	██████████
04	02 MAR 05	0022	M3 IS @ ██████████ W/ ██████████	NOT'D BTL CPT	██████████
05	02 MAR 05	0028	██████████ CALLS ██████████ FOR IP'S TO SHOW UP W/ AMBULANCE @ ██████████ WHERE ONE LOCAL NATIONAL IS WOUNDED	NOT'D ██████████	██████████
	02 MAR 05	0032	██████████ REQUESTS A PLT SIZE ELEMENT FROM ██████████ TO 419 750 WHERE 3 PASSENGERS AND 5 CARS		
07	02 MAR 05	0036	██████████ REPORTS VBIED @ ██████████ WHICH ██████████ DESTROYED	NOT'D BTL CPT	██████████
08	02 MAR 05	0045	██████████ WANTS ██████████ TO GIVE SITREP ON SITUATION ON IN ██████████ AO WHEN ██████████ RETURNS	NOT'D BTL CPT	██████████
09	02 MAR 05	0054	██████████ REPORTS KIA (5) AIF. SURROUNDED W/ AMMO AND MAGAZNES. ON ROOF TOP RAG NEST. ONE WIA (FEMALE WOUNDED IN THIGH AND FOOT). EARLIER IP'S MOVING INTO KILLER SECTOR WHERE AMBUSH BY AIF. KILLER ELEMENT WENT TO LOCATION WHERE INCIDENT HAPPENED. ING WITHDREW WHEN ██████████ ELEMENT APPROACHED. ██████████ TOOK THE FIGHT FROM THE STREET TO THE HOUSE. ██████████ FOUND ONE OF THE AIF THAT WAS SENIOR BAATH PARTY MEMBER OF 25 YRS.	NOT'D BTL CPT	██████████
10	02 MAR 05	0054	██████████ REPORTS RAPID FIRE 10-12 ROUNDS 800M WEST OF THEIR LOCATION. GOING TO INVESTIGATE AREA OF INCIDENT.	NOT BTL CPT	██████████
11	02 MAR 05	0105	██████████ REPORTS TWO CARS APPROACHED THEIR LOCATION FROM WHERE SHOTS WERE HEARD. IN THE PROCESS OF SEARCHING TWO CARS.	NOT BTL CPT	██████████
12	02 MAR 05	0121	██████████ ADVISES; ██████████ SECURE, 6PAX, 4 MALES, 2 FEMALES. NO ENEMY ENCOUNTERED. CURRENTLY QUESTIONING @ ██████████	NOT BTL CPT	██████████
13	02 MAR 05	0130	██████████ ADVISES TARGET HAS BEEN POSITIVLY IDENTIFIED.	NOT BTL CPT	██████████
14	02 MAR 05	0140	██████████ REPORTS RADER ACQUISITION AT ██████████ ██████████ SENT TO INVESTIGATE	NOT BTL CPT	██████████