ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

In Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 63 U.S.L.W. 4009 (Nov. 14, 1994)(5-4), the Court ruled that the Eleventh Amendment does not extend to a bistate railway created by New Jersey and New York through an interstate compact approved by Congress. Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg emphasized the Port Authority's financial independence and the fact that neither New York nor New Jersey was responsible for any judgments against the Port Authority. She also noted that the Port Authority could not have been created without the approval of Congress and thus it was not purely a creature of the states. Justice O'Connor's dissent argued that the critical issue was control, not financial independence, and that New York and New Jersey retained sufficient control over the Port Authority's operations to justify application of the Eleventh Amendment.

Habeas Corpus

In Schlup v. Delo, 63 U.S.L.W. 4089 (Jan. 23, 1995)(5-4), the Court considered the proper standard for showing "actual innocence" in order to support a second habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance at trial and the constitutional failure of the prosecution to produce exculpatory evidence at trial. The lower courts had held that the defendant was barred from bringing a successive petition unless he could show "by clear and con- vincing evidence that but for a constitutional error, no reason- able juror would have found" the defendant guilty. Finding this standard too stringent, the majority ruled that it is sufficient for the defendant to show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted in light of all the evidence now available. Once this showing of "actual innocence" is made, the Court held, the defendant is entitled to raise his claims of constitutional error in a successive petition.

In Duncan v. Henry, 63 U.S.L.W. 3560 (Jan. 23, 1995)(8-1), the Court rejected the habeas corpus claim of a state prisoner who had objected to the admissibility of certain evidence at trial on the ground that it was a "miscarriage of justice" but who had not explicitly raised any federal constitutional claim. The majority held, as a result, that Henry had not exhausted his state remedies because his federal due process claim had not been "fairly presented" to the state courts. In a lone dissent, Justice Stevens argued that "[t]he new rule the Court announces today is hypertechnical and unwise." Id. at 3561.

In O'Neal v. McAninch, 63 U.S.L.W. 4126 (Feb. 21, 1995) (6-3), the Court ruled that a writ of habeas corpus should be issued if the habeas court is in "grave doubt" as to whether or not a constitutional violation that occurred during trial was harmless error. In effect, this places the burden of proof on the state to prove harmless error rather than on the habeas petitioner to prove prejudice. The majority opinion by Justice Breyer is particularly remarkable for its emphasis on the role of habeas corpus in avoiding imprisonment of the innocent. This marks a dramatic shift in tone from the Court's recent habeas decisions, which predominantly emphasized the state's interest in finality. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief in support of the habeas petitioner, largely on the grounds ultimately adopted by the Court.
Summary of Argument in ACLU amicus brief

In Goeke v. Branch, 63 U.S.L.W. 3688 (Mar. 20, 1995)(9-0), a unanimous Court summarily reversed an Eighth Circuit decision holding that Missouri could not deny a convicted murderer the right to appeal because she fled following her conviction absent some evidence of prejudice to the appellate process. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court concluded that the due process principle announced by the Eighth Circuit was, at the very least, a new rule that could not be applied in a habeas proceeding under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and that the Teague claim had not been waived by the state. The Supreme Court's opinion also strongly suggested that it disagreed with the lower court's view of the due process clause.

In Garlotte v. Fordice, 63 U.S.L.W. 4476 (May 30, 1995) (7-2), the Court held that a prisoner who is serving consecutive sentences may challenge the validity of the first sentence in a habeas corpus proceeding even after that sentence has expired so long as the prisoner is still serving the second sentence and thus "in custody" for purposes of the habeas corpus statute.

Rico

In United States v. Robertson, 63 U.S.L.W. 4386 (May 1, 1995)(9-0), the Court unanimously upheld, in a per curiam opinion, a RICO indictment alleging that defendants had engaged in a criminal enterprise involving a gold mine in Alaska that purchased equipment out of state, hired workers out of state, and shipped approximately 15% of its ore out of state. According to the Court, these allegations were sufficient to establish that the enterprise "engaged in . . . interstate" commerce, which is one of RICO's jurisdictional predicates.

Federal Criminal Law

In United States v. Shabani, 63 U.S.L.W.4001 (Nov. 1, 1994) (9-0), the Court unanimously held that the federal drug conspir- acy statute, 21 U.S.C. 846, can be violated without any proof that the defendant engaged in an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. The defendant argued that, absent an overt act requirement, the statute punished criminal thoughts rather than criminal deeds. Justice O'Connor's opinion rejected that argu- ment, however, noting that criminal conspiracies had been regarded as prohibited acts, in and of themselves, since the early nineteenth century.

In United States v. X-Citement Video, 63 U.S.L.W. 4019 (Nov. 29, 1994)(7-2), the Court interpreted the federal child pornog- raphy statute to require proof that the defendant "knew" that one of the performers engaged in explicit sexual conduct was a minor. The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, con- ceded that its construction of the statute was "ungrammatical." Nevertheless, the Court concluded that a literal reading of the law -- which would require the government to prove only that the defendant knowingly transported the material in interstate commerce -- would produce "absurd" results. In justifying its decision, the Court relied on the general presumption that criminal statutes contain a scienter requirement. The Court also noted that a contrary construction of the statute would raise serious constitutional questions. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented.

In Hubbard v. United States, 63 U.S.L.W. 4393 (May 15, 1995)(6-3), the Court held that 18 U.S.C. 1001, which prohibits false statements to a "department or agency of the United States," could not be used to prosecute false statements to the Bankruptcy Court because the Bankruptcy Court could not fairly be construed as a "department or agency of the United States" under the statute. In adopting this construction of the statute, the Court expressly overruled its prior decision in United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955). The Court's decision is perhaps most interesting as part of its ongoing, internal dialogue about the meaning and significance of stare decisis.

In United States v. Aguilar, 63 U.S.L.W. 4637 (June 21, 1995), the Court upheld, by an 8-1 vote, the conviction of a federal district judge for disclosing a wiretap in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2232(c). Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the defendant's argument that the statute could not apply since the wiretap had, in fact, expired by the time the disclosure was made. By a 6-3 vote, however, the Court reversed the defendant's conviction for obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. 1503. According to the Court, 1503 requires some "nexus" to judicial proceedings and, thus, did not reach the defendant's false statements to an FBI agent.

Federal Rules of Evidence

In Tome v. United States, 63 U.S.L.W. 4046 (January 10, 1995)(5-4), the Court held that the federal hearsay exception that permits prior statements by a witness to rebut a charge of recent fabrication does not apply to statements made after the motive for fabrication arose. The evidentiary dispute occurred in the context of a sexual abuse trial. In his first Supreme Court opinion, Justice Breyer dissented on the ground that the majority's rule unduly restricted the flexibility of trial judges to make judgments about relevancy.

In United States v. Mezzanatto, 63 U.S.L.W. 4060 (Jan. 18, 1995)(7-2), the Court held that statements made by a defendant during plea negotiations could be introduced by the prosecution for impeachment purposes if, prior to the plea negotiations, the defendant knowingly waived his right to have such statements deemed inadmissible under the federal rules. The defendant had argued that the rule of inadmissibility was unwaivable. The Court disagreed. However, five members of the court (three in concurrence and two in dissent) expressly noted that more serious questions would be raised if the prosecution attempted to use the defendant's statements as part of the government's case-in-chief.

Immigration

In Stone v. INS, 63 U.S.L.W. 4294 (April 19, 1995)(6-3), the Court ruled that filing a timely motion for reconsideration of a deportation decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals does not toll the 90 day time limit for seeking judicial review of the decision.

Arbitration

In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 63 U.S.L.W. 4079 (Jan. 18, 1995)(7-2), the Court held that an Alabama state rule invalidating predispute arbitration agreements was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, which the Court construed to apply whenever a contract "in fact" involved interstate commerce. In Justice Breyer's first majority opinion, the Court further held that the reference to interstate commerce in the Arbitration Act was meant to be as broad as the Commerce Clause itself.

In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 63 U.S.L.W. 4195 (Mar. 6, 1995)(8-1), the Court ruled that punitive damages were available in an arbitration between a private investor and a securities dealer. The dealer had relied on the fact that the underlying arbitration agreement referred to New York State law, which does not permit punitive damages in arbitration. The Court nevertheless refused to enforce this ban on the theory that it was not clearly stated in the contract and it was therefore "unlikely" that plaintiffs had "any idea that by signing a standard-form agreement to arbitrate disputes they might be giving up an important substantive right." Id. at 4198.

In First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 63 U.S.L.W. 4459 (May 22, 1995)(9-0), held that the question of whether a dispute over the arbitrator's jurisdiction is itself arbitrable or must be resolved in court depends upon the intent of the parties as expressed in the original arbitration agreement.

Jurisdiction and Justiciabilty

In Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 63 U.S.L.W. 4005 (Nov. 8, 1994)(9-0), the Court unanimously ruled that the settlement of a case while it is pending on appeal may moot the appeal but it does not, ordinarily, justify an order vacating the decision below. Construing its previous decision in United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36 (1950) the Court held that an order vacating the lower court decision is appropriate when mootness occurs "through happenstance," thus denying the losing party any chance to pursue its appeal. By contrast, a party that settles a case effectively waives its right to appellate review and thus there is no unfairness in allowing the lower court decision to stand. Finally, the Court noted, a stipulation in the settlement providing for vacatur is insuffi- cient to overcome this general rule.

In Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 63 U.S.L.W. 4027 (Dec. 6, 1994)(7-1), the FEC filed a petition for certiorari from a ruling of the D.C. Court of Appeals that the composition of the FEC violated separation of powers because it included nonvoting members from the Senate and House. In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, the Court concluded that only the Solicitor General could petition for certiorari under these circumstances, that the FEC lacked authority to file its own petition, and that the Solicitor General's effort to ratify the FEC's filing after-the-fact was untimely and thus invalid.

In Anderson v. Green, 63 U.S.L.W. 4162 (Feb. 22, 1995)(per curiam), the Court ruled that a challenge to California's system of providing new residents to the state with lower AFDC payments than residents who had lived in the state for one year or longer was not ripe since the program could not go into effect without a federal waiver and the initial federal waiver had been struck down as invalid in a parallel litigation. Having concluded that the controversy was no longer ripe, the Court then vacated the Ninth Circuit decision, which had enjoined enforcement of the statute as unconstitutional. The ACLU was co-counsel for plaintiffs challenging the statute.

In Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 63 U.S.L.W. 4189 (March 1, 1995)(9-0), the Court unanimously held that the issue of whether a county can be held liable for the decisions of one of its officials in a 1983 action on the theory that the official exercises final policymaking authority for the county is not a proper subject for an interlocutory appeal even if, as here, other defendants are pursuing an interlocutory appeal on the question of qualified immunity. Justice Ginsburg's opinion specifically rejected the notion of pendent appellate jurisdic- tion that several lower courts had adopted, including the Eleventh Circuit in this case. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief supporting plaintiff's position on the merits, which were never reached by the Court because of its jurisdictional holding.

In Johnson v. Jones, 63 U.S.L.W. 4552 (June 12, 1995)(9-0), the Court unanimously ruled that a government defendant who seeks summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity is entitled to take an interlocutory appeal on the question of whether his conduct violated clearly established law but is not entitled to take an interlocutory appeal on the question of whether he committed the acts alleged in the complaint. Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer held that the "I didn't do it" defense did not justify an exception to the general rule against interlocu- tory appeals in the federal system.

In Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 63 U.S.L.W. 4544 (June 12, 1995)(8-0), the Court unanimously ruled that a federal district court has broad discretion to stay a declaratory judgment action during the pendency of a parallel state court proceeding. The Court's decision rested squarely on the unique characteristics of the Declaratory Judgment Act. As Justice O'Connor noted: "We have repeatedly characterized the Declaratory Judgment Act as 'an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the Court rather than an absolute right on the litigant.'" Id. at 4547.