SIXTH AMENDMENT

Trial By Jury

In United States v. Gaudin, 63 U.S.L.W. 4611 (June 19, 1995)(9-0), the Court unanimously reversed the defendant's conviction for making false statements on HUD loan documents in alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001. Under 100l, false state- ments are criminal only if they are material. In defendant's case, the materiality of the false statements was decided by the trial judge and never submitted to the jury. On appeal, the Court ruled that the materiality of the false statements was an element of the offense under 1001 and, therefore, a question for the jury to resolve.

Death Penalty

In Harris v. Alabama, 63 U.S.L.W. 4147 (Feb. 22, 1995)(8-1), the Supreme Court upheld Alabama's death penalty scheme, which provides that the judge must "consider" but need not follow the jury's recommendation in a capital case. In this particular case, the jury recommended life without parole. The judge, however, imposed a sentence of death after concluding that the aggravating circumstances "far outweighed" the mitigating circum- stances. The defendant's principal argument was that the trial judge could not be granted unbridled discretion in following or ignoring the jury's recommendation. Writing for the majority Justice O'Connor rejected that argument, primarily on the ground that the state could, if it chose, leave the sentencing decision entirely to the judge. Accordingly, she reasoned, the Constitu- tion could not require that the jury's advisory recommendation be given any special weight.

In Lackey v. Texas, 63 U.S.L.W. 3705 (Mar. 27, 1995), Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, issued a potentially important opinion concurring in the denial of certiorari in this death penalty case but expressing their view that the question of whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a prisoner who has already spent 17 years on death row "is an important undecided one." Id.

Term Limits

In U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 63 U.S.L.W. 4413 (May 22, 1995)(5-4), the Court effectively ended the movement to enact term limits for Congress on a state-by-state basis. In a lengthy majority opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court held that the qualifications for Congress established in the Constitution itself were "fixed" and could not be amended by the states without a constitutional amendment. The Court's opinion rested heavily on history and the Court's concept of federalism. (The dissent had a very different view of federalism and the result it commanded in this case.) In a critical passage, Justice Stevens wrote that the notion of congressional term limits violates the "fundamental principle of our representative democracy . . . 'that the people should chose whom they please to govern them.'" Id. at 4425. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief arguing that congressional term limits were unconstitutional under the Qualifications Clause. Summary of Argument in ACLU amicus brief

Commerce Clause

In United States v. Lopez, 63 U.S.L.W. 4343 (April 26, 1995)(5-4), the Court struck down the federal Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 on the grounds that it exceeded Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause. The decision, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, marks the first time since 1936 that the Court has relied on the Commerce Clause to invalidate federal legislation. However, in a separate concurring opinion, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor stressed that the majority's rationale did not call into question the validity of prior decisions upholding the validity of such landmark civil rights legislation as the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Id. at 4350.

Ex Post Facto Clause

In California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 63 U.S.L.W. 4327 (April 25, 1995)(7-2), the Court upheld the constitutional- ity of a California statute that altered the state's parole procedures for prisoners convicted of more than one murder. At the time respondent committed his second murder (while on parole for the first), California law provided for annual parole hearings. A subsequent change in the law, however, authorized the Parole Board to schedule respondent's hearings only once every three years. In rejecting respondent's challenge under the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Court concluded that the likelihood that this change in the law would actually increase respondent's time in prison was too remote to justify striking down the law.

Prisoners' Rights

In Sandin v. Conner, 63 U.S.L.W. 4601 (June 19, 1995)(5-4), the Court held that a state prisoner who was sentenced to 30 days of "disciplinary segregation" for alleged violation of prison rules did not have a due process right to challenge the procedures by which that determination was made. Acknowledging that the Court's holding represented a departure from the approach followed in prior cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist only applies when the state "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id. at 4605. Both dissents, one written by Justice Ginsburg and one by Justice Breyer, quarrelled with the majority's characterization of solitary confinement as an insignificant hardship. The ACLU wrote an amicus brief supporting the prisoner's due process claim.
Summary of Argument in ACLU amicus brief

Equal Protection

In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 63 U.S.L.W. 4523 (June 12, 1995)(5-4), the Court held that federal affirmative action programs are subject to strict scrutiny and, thus, can only be upheld if they are narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest. In reaching this conclusion, the Court expressly overruled its contrary holding in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Adarand acknowledged the propriety of affirmative action programs that meet the strict scrutiny standard. But, she rejected the notion that the federal government was entitled to greater deference than the states in crafting affirmative action programs. In addition, she rejected the notion that programs designed to remedy discrimination should be judged by a less rigorous standard than programs that perpetuate discrimination. In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Thomas attacked what he characterized as the "racial paternalism" of affirmative action. Id. at 4534. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief urging the Court to adhere to its past decisions, which had recognized a special role for the federal government in assuring equal rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Summary of Argument in ACLU amicus brief

In Missouri v. Jenkins, 63 U.S.L.W. 4486 (June 12, 1995) (5-4), the Court vacated two remedial orders issued by the district court in a long-running school desegregation case in Kansas City, Missouri. One order had required the state to increase salaries for school personnel. The other order had required to the state to continue to fund remedial educational programs until test scores improved. Both orders were justified as part of the effort to lure white children from the suburbs back into the city school system. Writing for the majority, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the district court's "pursuit of 'desegregative attractiveness,'" id. at 4494, exceeded the scope of its remedial authority. In the final sentence of the majority opinion, moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist placed the goal of returning control of the schools to the local school board on the same plane as the goal of remedying the effects of past discrimination. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief supporting the district court's remedial orders.
Summary of Argument in ACLU amicus brief

In Purkett v. Elem, 63 U.S.L.W. 3814 (May 15, 1995)(7-2), the Court summarily reversed a Eighth Circuit decision granting the defendant's request for a writ of habeas corpus based on a so-called Batson claim. The Eighth Circuit had held that a prosecutor could not satisfy his burden under Batson by offering an implausible explanation for a pattern of peremptory challenges that appears discriminatory on its face. The Supreme Court disagreed in a per curiam opinion, holding that the prosecutor's only burden is to offer a race-neutral explanation; the defendant must then establish that the prosecutor's explanation is pretext- ual. Justice Stevens' dissent complained that the majority opinion effectively overruled "a portion" of Batson. Id. at 3815. It is unclear whether that prophecy will be borne out in practice.

Voting Rights

In Miller v. Johnson, 63 U.S.L.W. (June 29, 1995)(5-4), the Court held that the state must satisfy strict scrutiny when- ever race is the "predominant" factor in the drawing of legislative district lines. The majority opinion by Justice Kennedy further held that the state's compliance with the Justice Department's views under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act did not meet the strict scrutiny test, at least on the facts of this case. Instead, the Court said, the Justice Department had misinterpreted the Voting Rights Act to require the "maximiza- tion" of minority voting strength. The ACLU represented an interracial group of voters that intervened in Johnson to defend the constitutionality of Georgia's effort to achieve compliance with the Voting Rights Act.

In United States v. Louisiana, 63 U.S.L.W. (June 29, 1995)(9-0), the Court concluded that white voters do not have standing to challenge a majority-minority congressional district under the Equal Protection Clause if they do not live in the district. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief defending the district and also raising the standing issue.

Due Process

In Reich v. Collins, 63 U.S.L.W. 4032 (December 6, 1994) (9-0), the Court unanimously held that Georgia could not deny a federal retiree the right to seek a refund for taxes that had been unconstitutionally imposed on his federal retirement benefits by ruling, for the first time, that under Georgia law he should have protested the taxes before they were paid rather than suing for a refund afterwards. The Court emphasized that Georgia was not under any obligation to provide a refund procedure. But, having chosen to provide one, it could not "reconfigure its scheme, unfairly, in mid-course," to deny the taxpayer a procedural remedy that he had the right to assume would be available.

In Kyles v. Whitley, 63 U.S.L.W. 4303 (April 19, 1995)(5-4), the Court held that the state had violated its Brady obligations by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense in this capital case and, accordingly, granted the defendant's request for a writ of habeas corpus. In a majority opinion by Justice Souter, the Court explained that Brady is violated whenever there is a "reasonable probability" that the withheld evidence would have affected the result. The Court also emphasized that Brady applies even if the withheld evidence was known only to the police and not to the prosecution. Finally, the Court applied these legal standards to the evidence in this case and concluded that the verdict, and sentence of death, could not be allowed to stand. In his dissent, Justice Scalia complained that, even in a capital case, the Court overstepped its role by resolving what was essentially a factual dispute on the significance of the withheld evidence.

State Action

In Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 63 U.S.L.W. 4109 (Feb. 21, 1995)(8-1), the Supreme Court held that Amtrak is a government entity and its decision to reject a political bill- board in New York's Penn Station is therefore subject to First Amendment scrutiny. The state action issue arose because the federal statute that created Amtrak as a corporation specifically provides that it "will not be an agency or establishment of the United States Government." Nevertheless, Justice Scalia's majority opinion held that this congressional characterization was less important for state action purposes than three other factors: (1) Amtrak was created by a special law; (2) it was created to further governmental objectives; and (3) the govern- ment retained the permanent right to appoint a majority of its directors. 63 U.S.L.W. at 4117. As Justice Scalia observed, the government cannot "evade the most solemn obligations imposed in the Constitution by simply resorting to the corporate form." Id. at 4116. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief supporting plain- tiff's state action argument in this case.
Summary of Argument in ACLU amicus brief

Fair Housing Act

In City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 63 U.S.L.W. 4402 (May 15, 1995)(6-3), the Court upheld the right of a halfway house to challenge a local zoning rule that limited homes to single family residences and then defined the term family to include any group of related persons (regardless of size) or no more than five unrelated persons living together. Oxford House contended that the challenged regulation constituted a form of discrimination against the handicapped. In response, the City argued that its regulation was a reasonable occupancy restriction and that Congress had specifically exempted such restrictions from the antidiscrimination provisions of the Fair Housing Act. In permitting the suit to go forward, the Court ruled that an occupancy restriction must apply uniformly to all dwellings. By contrast, the Court noted, "Edmonds' family composition rule surely does not answer the question: 'What is the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a house.'" Id. at 4405. The ACLU served as co-counsel for Oxford House in its challenge to the regulation.
Summary of Argument in ACLU amicus brief

Age Discrimination in Employment Act

In McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 63 U.S.L.W. 4104 (Jan. 23, 1995)(9-0), the Court unanimously held that an employer cannot defeat a claim of employment discrimination under the ADEA (or other antidiscrimination laws) by relying on evi- dence of employee misconduct discovered by the employer while defending against the employment discrimination claim. Such after-acquired evidence is relevant, however, to determining the appropriate remedy for the discriminatory conduct. Thus, the Court noted, a discrimination victim who could have been fired on the basis of the after-acquired evidence is normally not entitled to reinstatement, or to backpay after the date the employee misconduct was discovered.
Summary of Argument in ACLU amicus brief

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Schleier, 63 U.S.L.W. 4557 (June 14, 1995)(6-3), the Court held that a settlement award for backpay and liquidated damages under the ADEA represents taxable income. The Internal Revenue Code excludes from tax any damages received "on account of personal injuries or sickness." The Court concluded, however, that an backpay award under the ADEA is not "'on account of' any personal injury . . . because no personal injury affected the amount of back wages recovered." Id. at 4560. Similarly, the Court ruled, liquidated damages under the ADEA are properly taxable because they were intended by Congress to be punitive rather than compensatory in nature.

Section 1983

In National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 63 U.S.L.W. 4632 (June 19, 1995)(9-0), the Court unanimously rejected the claim that a state taxpayer could seek declaratory or injunctive relief against a state taxing scheme in state court under 1983. All parties agreed that such relief would be barred in federal court under the Tax Injunction Act. All parties also agreed, however, the that Tax Injunction Act did not apply in state court. In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court nevertheless concluded that constitutional challenges to state tax laws could not be brought under 1983 in any forum.