_TOP-#SCRETT

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT WASHINGTON, D.C. FILED KAREN E. SUTTON, CLERK

U.S. Foreign Infulligence Surveillance Coort

Docket No. PR/TT

GEORGE J. TENET, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

- (U) I, GEORGE J. TENET, do hereby declare and state:
- 1. (Q) I am the Director of Central Intelligence
 (DCI), a position I have held since 11 July 1997. Prior to
 serving as DCI, I served since 1 July 1995 as the Deputy
 Director of Central Intelligence. Sefore that, I served
 since January 1993 on the National Security Council (NSC)
 staff as Special Assistant to the President for National
 Security Affairs and Senior Director for Intelligence
 Programs. Prior to my service at the NSC, I spent more
 than seven years on the staff of the Senate Select
 Committee on Intelligence, including as Staff Director from
 November 1988 through January 1993.

TOR SECRET/

TOR SHCRETT!

catablished by the National Security Act of 1947, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. \$6 401, et seq. Pursuant to section 102(a) of the National Security Act. 50 U.S.C. \$6 403(a), I, as DCI, serve as head of the United States (US) intelligence community, act as the principal advisor to the President of the United States for intelligence matters related to the national security, and serve as the head of CIA. Pursuant to section 1.3(d)(5) of the National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. \$ 403-3(c)(6), I am further charged as DCI with establishing requirements and priorities for foreign intelligence information to be collected under the Poreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, 50 U.S.C. \$ 1801 et seq.

TOP-EXCRET//

⁽U) Section 3(4) of the Mational Security Act of 1947, as amonded, codified at 50 U.S.C. \$ 401a(4), defines the "intelligence community" to include the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence; the Central Intelligence Agency; the Mational Security Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Mational Inegery and Mapping Agency; the Mational Recognaissance Office; other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of apecialized national intelligence through recognaissance programs; the Intelligence elements of the military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Massay, and the Coast Guard; the Bureau of Intelligence and Massarch of the Department of State; the elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned with the analyses of foreign intelligence information; and such other elements of any other department or agency as any be designated by the Fresident, or designated jointly by the DCI and the head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the intelligence community.

TOP-SECKST/

(U) Under section 102% of the Mational Security Act, 50 U.S.C. \$ 403-1, the function of the CIA is to assist me as DCI to carry out my responsibilities as set forth in paragraphs (1) through (5) of section 103(d) of the National Security Act. Pursuant to section 103(d), codified at 50 U.S.C. \$ 403-3(d), as head of the CIA, I am charged with collecting intelligence through human sources and other appropriate means (excluding police, subposes, or law unforcement powers or internal security functions); providing overall direction for the collection of national intelligence through human sources by elements of the U.S. intelligence community; correlating and evaluating intelligence related to the national security and providing appropriate dissemination of such intelligence; performing such additional services as are of common concern to the elements of the U.S. intelligence community; and performing such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or National Security Council may direct. A more particularized statement of the authorities of the DCI and CIA is set forth in sections 1.5 and 1.9 of Executive Order

тор авсиле?/

12333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. 5 401 note, and as amended by Executive Order 13284, 68 Fed. Reg. 4,073 (Jan. 28, 2003).

4. I am submitting this Declaration to provide the Court with my assessment of the current, and possibly imminent, threat to the national security of the United States of America posed by

te

perpetrate a large-scale terrorist attack or attacks on US soil

I understand that to counter this possible imminent threat, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) is, among other things, seeking authority from this court co-install and use pen register and trap and trace devices to support FBI investigations to identify

, in the United States and abroad, by obtaining the metadata regarding their electronic communications. I intend in this Declaration to provide factual and threat assessment support for that DOJ request.

TOP SECRET/

| and the second s | - | - | |
|--|---|---|--|
| TOP MECHET// | | | |
| | | | |

5. (U) The representations set forth herein are based upon my personal review, appraisal, and consideration of the information discussed below and upon discussions with intelligence community personnel who are knowledgeable about the activities described herein.

| | 6. | As d | escribed | in | greater | detail | below, |
|-----|--------------|-----------|----------|-----|-----------|--------|--------|
| the | intelligence | community | has guth | exe | ed a very | strong | 2 |

have reported on

efforts to develop

anthrax, acquire fissile material, and deploy chemical weapons. While we have no specific information regarding the exact times, targets, or tactics for these planned attacks, we have gathered and continue to gather intelligence that leads us to believe that the next terrorist attack or attacks on US soil could be isminent.

TOP-SECURTY!

| TOP-SHCERY/ | |
|-------------|---|
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | * |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |

TOP GROKETT

TOD SHCKNY/

TOR SECRET?

TOP-SHCHET//

TOP-SECRET/

1871 (e) (2) PRODUCTION JULY 2009 2386

TOP SECRET!

TOP SECRET/

1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION JULY 2009 2387

(b)(1) (b)(3)

- TOP SECRET//

13,

TOP SECRET/

TU.

(b)(1) (b)(3)

TOP SHCHNIT!

TOP SECRET/

Ti

| | MERCA! | |
|------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| 16. | sle. | are also some |
| | | are also concerned that |
| the branusd stra | ck (or attacks) on t | the US homeland is |
| designed to be t | he colmination of a | coordinated series of |
| stracks orchestr | ated from | |
| | TOWN ALVIN | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |

TOP-SECRET/

1871 (a) (2) PRODUCTION JULY 2009 2390

(b)(1) (b)(3)

TOP SHOKEY/

TOP SECRET!//

13

1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION JULY 2089 2381

дов-овениту

18. Judging from the information provided

, four key factors will frame to execute the US attack strike in the

coming months:

US Election Politics

TOP BECRET//

33

TOP SECRET!/

judge --as the one who is to provide the execution order for the attack--will most likely refrain from launching the strike until he assesses the operation's chances of maximum impact, both in terms of casualties and the economic and political ripple effects.

TOP SECRET

18

TOR BECKET/ Musharraf Assessination was behind the assassination attempts on Pakistan President Husharraf on 14 and 25 December 2003, a pursuit consistent with detainse reporting ns. well as with public statements by

Underscoring the importance of

TOR-SECRET//

14

1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION JULY 2009 2394

| - | Mile . | | 57// |
|---|--------|--|------|
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

Maziristan to the group's survival,

Significant Captures or Disruptions - The capture of key operatives involved in the US plot or the disruption of parallel plotting against other.

Western targets bould lead the to move up the timetable for the US attack rather than risk losing the opportunity to strike. We continue to investigate whether the August 2001 arrest of Secarias Moussaoul may have accelerated the timetable for the 9/11 attacks because he knew of al-Qa'ida's intention to use commercial aircraft as weapons. Arrests in Canada and the UK of key players in the UK bombing network could lead al-Qa'ida leaders to conclude that

TOR-BBCKETT/

TA.

TOP-SECRET/

their plans and intentions have been compromised, spurring them to proceed with the US strike even before all the preferred operational pieces are in place.

does not provide specific information on the

TOP-SECRET!

18

1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION JULY 2009 2396

| TOR-SECTE | 7/ |
|-------------------|---|
| targets to be hit | or methods to be used in the US attack |
| attacks. | |
| | |
| | Our understanding of |
| strategic targeti | ing doctrine, gleaned from detainee |
| reporting and | public statements since 9/11, |
| suggests | selected targets for this operation |
| that come closest | to meeting the following oritoria: |
| · Targets asso | ciated with recognised symbols of US life |
| and power. | |
| | |
| | will result in mass casualties and spres |
| foar. | |
| * Targets that | will negatively impact the OS economy. |
| | Teneral commence of the same distance. |
| 20. | Attacks against or in the host cities |
| | c and Republican Party conventions would |
| be especially att | |
| | , multiple stracks against critical US |
| | pecifically, systems of mass transit |
| | drid attacksalso have the potential to |
| heat all three to | rgeting goals. |
| | |
| TOP SECRE | Ī/ |

19

| 21. | operational. |
|---|--------------------------|
| planners since 9/11, such as | have |
| include using general aviation as non-US-based commercial flights to be methods to overpower the flight | hat enter US sirepace, a |
| | |

| | The state of the state of | |
|----------------------------------|---|-----------------|
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| 23 | 1 | |
| 23. | The | also |
| mains committe | ed to obtaining a weapons-of | -mass- |
| mains committe struction capa | ed to obtaining a weapons-of | -mass- out a |
| mains committe struction capa | ed to obtaining a weapons-of | -mass- out a |
| mains committe struction capa | ed to obtaining a weapons-of sbility, and we cannot rule ical/Radiological/Nuclear (C | -mass- out a |
| mains committe struction capa | ed to obtaining a weapons-of | -mass- out a |
| mains committe struction capa | ed to obtaining a weapons-of sbility, and we cannot rule ical/Radiological/Nuclear (C | -mass- out a |
| mains committe struction capa | ed to obtaining a weapons-of sbility, and we cannot rule ical/Radiological/Nuclear (C | -mass- out a |
| mains committe struction capa | ed to obtaining a weapons-of sbility, and we cannot rule ical/Radiological/Nuclear (C | -mass- out a |
| mains committe struction capa | ed to obtaining a weapons-of sbility, and we cannot rule ical/Radiological/Nuclear (C | -mass- out a |
| mains committe struction capa | ed to obtaining a weapons-of | -mass- out a |

TOR-SECRETY.

been detailed extensively by numerous

24. Noreover, a steady stream of threat reporting since 9/11 reveals al-Qa'ida's continued interest in attacking US nuclear power plants and reflects the group's recognition of the potential economic and political impact such an attack might have.

DOP-SECRETY/

95

1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION JULY 2008 2400

-YOP SECRET/)

Horth American-based cells involved in tactical planning offers the most direct path to stopping an attack or attacks squing the US homeland. Numerous credible intelligence reports since 9/11 indicate has "sleepers" in North America. We judge that those "sleepers" have been in North America, and the US in general, for much of the past two years. We base our judgment, in part,

TOP SECRET!

23

| the second secon | as well as |
|--|----------------------------|
| on information | that |
| had operatives here. W | e also judge that multiple |
| disruptions overseas, such as | the detentions of |
| | as well as |
| post-9/11 enhanced security me | asures in the US, probably |
| delayed and/or altered operati | onal planning by these |
| leepers several times during | the past two years. |
| | |
| 26. | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| sreas to deny safe haven to | leaders. |
| sreas to deny safe haven to | leaders. |
| | leaders. |
| | leaders. |

TOR SHOKET//

the requested pen

registers and trap and trace devices are critical because

they can

such attacks against our citizensy.

TOP-HECKETT/

y h

1871 (c) (2) PRODUCTION JULY 2009 2403

TOP SECRET?

(U) I hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this __

2004

CEORGE U. TENER DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

TOP SECRET//