Department of Defense

Department of Defense
(released by the Government 3/25/2005, released by the ACLU 3/25/05)

Agency Stamp	Record	Date of Record	Record Description
780-784	Pre-transfer medical assessment form		Blank form to be filled out by physician
785-792	Detainee Treatment & Procedures (Camp Duke SOP)	6/1/2004	"Each of the detainees will remain in sight of the guards at all times for the exception of when they are in the latrine or being interrogated." (785) "Soldiers who are on a work detail in the facility may downgrade [sic] their uniform to t-shirt [sic] and soft hat only after approval..." "After the number of detainees exceeds 25 there will be an increase in security. One guard per holding cell that is occupied." (786) "ROI/ROE: Self defense is always authorized." (787) "If a detainee should break any of the camp rules they may be placed in an isolated holding cell." (788) "Camp rules: Do not create problems in the camp." "Procedures for filling a complaint: A detainee may file a complaint by first informing the SOG of his/her desire to file a complaint." (789) "Incoming [sic]: Female detainees will be searched by another female if at all possible." Under TRAINING heading, describes what appears to be a very perfunctory method of showing a slideshow/having trainees read SOP and sign saying they understood--no evaluation of such understanding. Concludes, "All guards are to be informed of the availability of a stress control unit and facilities on Camp Duke...this service is available to them at any time." "A current copy of the Geneva Convention is present at the facilities": does not evaluate understanding/adherence.
793-794	WARNO, Minimum standards for brigade holding areas(2nd armored calvary)	Aug-03	CHANGE to 1AD Frago 383A (Gen. Order on Civilian/Detainee Maltreatment) is changed: "Detainees will be treated by all forces with personal dignity and in accordance with international humanitarian law." CHANGE: "Detainees will not remain at the Regimental Holding Area for more than 72 hours." Establishes standards of hygiene, sanitary conditions, cell security, medical attn, general welfare, etc. (794)
796-850	Joint Training Exercises	3/20/1998	General regulations, overall command structure, procedure, budget, etc. with regard to training exercises and programs, selection of trainees, deployment, role of FAA, blank forms for field budget estimate and final cost report, incl. glossary.
851-854	Flagged e-mail with importance marked high + word attachment	6/23/2004	Discussion of standards in training, states these tasks as not included in training: "individual/detainee frisk, undress" (how to), "capabilities and limitations of the interrogation," "support relationships between military police and military intelligence in detainee operations", "humane treatment of detainees", "integration of procedures for evacuation, control. and administration of detainees"--author observes, "[I] see a seam developing in tasks that overlap MI and MP areas." The word document lists all of the tasks the author claimed were not included as a part of training.
855-858	e-mail with word attachment	8/24/2004	Word attachment: "Information Paper: Detainee Operations before and after May 2004 60 Minutes broadcast on Abu Ghraib", describes policy changes after news of Abu Ghraib broke to now "receive training on: The Law of War (Geneva Convention) briefing, Army Values briefing, Comply with the Law of War and the Geneva and Hague Conventions" States that "before 4 May: ...FORSCOM OIF/OEF Training guidance did not explicitly address training tasks related to preparing soldiers to report detainee abuse or using the ethical decision making process...No training was specifically directed in the OIF training guidance on differences in categories of detainees."
859-863	e-mail: RE: Balkans Pre-deployment Detention Training Requirements		Discussion via e-mail of training in detention standards and procedures stateside, prior to deployment to Balkans.
864-867		8/24/2004	Again attaches "Info. Paper: Detainee Operations before and after May 2004 60 Minutes broadscast on Abu Ghraib" stating "Made the corrections…thanks".
868-873	e-mail discussion of Senate hearing, record from Senate hearing	8/17/2004	LTC states--responding to whether or not lessons learned from abuses in Balkans have been implemented: "Not at all." (p. 868) Concludes, "The OIF units were not originally mobilized, trained, and deployed to conduct detention operations." Excerpts from Senate hearing of concern to authors of e-mails include posing questions of whether or not lessons from Kosovo were implemented (869) that "gathering tactical intelligence is an inherently governmental function...'barred from private sector performance.'" Subsequent questions examine this violation and potential culpability more closely.
874	e-mail: Detainee-related article 15S	6/21/2004	Judge Advocate General's call for data on any "detainee-related offense" for briefing.
875-876	e-mail: "Need Help"	8/31/2004	Seeking info. about a case in which a soldier "failed to follow the ROE and shot the detainee who was standing close to the perimeter wire." The soldier was charged with murder.
877-878	e-mail: Media Query: PUC HVTs	8/26/2004	Authored by Deputy Chief of Public Affairs, inquiring about Lt. Gen. John R. Vines who "approved ['ghost detainees'] while he was commander in Afghanistan" and seeking his "rationale for creating the category of 'persons under control, high value targets,'" in order to publicize it.
879-880	e-mail Re: Update on Detainee Criminal Cases	8/30/2004	Seeking "status of criminal cases involving detainees." Few details.
881-882	e-mail	8/30/2004	Reply to previous e-mail: "If you have something you want to pass to JCS, send to me."
883-884	e-mail	8/30/2004	Duplicate of previous e-mail.
885	e-mail	8/30/2004	Again, requesting a "weekly update", all the status of criminal cases involving detainees "collected in one spot": "Due to the sensitivity, you're going to have to ask for this stuff through OTJAG of JFCOM. Sorry, we're on pins and needles here."
886-887	e-mail	8/31/2004	Continuation of update dialogue: "Not a problem…it is not any better up here…we may formally request it through the Director, Joint Staff to the Army."
888-891	e-mail	8/31/2004	Forward of Washington Post article
892-894	e-mail	8/25/2004	Forward of Slate article
895	e-mail, Col. Staff Judge Advocate	8/23/2004	Forward of local Baltimore press article of Baltimore service member pleading guilty to abuse charges, 372 MP
896-901	e-mail, Col. Staff Judge Advocate	8/19/2004	Forward seeking help with questions posed by Senate hearing (see above). P. 900-1 is an information paper describing "short-term improvements in detainee training" such as "refresher training in the law of Land Warfare"
902-905	e-mail		Forward of LA Times article
906-907	e-mail: FW: Article 15 Detainee Data Cell	8/2/2004	Inquiry on detainee related offenses, specifies three units as "hav[ing] zero article 15s to report"
908-910	e-mail FW: KnightRidder Request	8/16/2004	Inquiry from KnightRidder journalist into deaths of two ghost detainees in December 2002. Forwarded to Gen. McNeill who says he is willing to talk to reporter about it.
911-980	e-mail: Senator Mikulski response, PDF attached		Inventory of training of the 372nd MP. Mostly schedules and details. "Military working dogs will be used…only if the lesser measure of force would not be effective and only after a challenge or order to halt is given." (976)
981-984	e-mail: RE: Detainee Ops	8/3/2004	Change in training policy: "ALL deploying OIF/OEF soldiers will receive the 8 hour Introduction to detainee Ops training we received from you. Only the units that have the specific detainee mission are required all the other related tasks which amounted to about five days of training."
985-986	e-mail: FORSCOM Tng Guidance: MI Interrogation Training Tasks	6/7/2004	Seeking feedback on implementing "stress management" and "use of force for detainee and interrogation operation" into training
987-988	e-mail: Lessons from the Abu prison	5/4/2004	"include expanding the training experience at CRC as suggested by CSM"--redirected all requests to "Chief of Staff, First US Army"
989	e-mail: MA fro Schlesinger Panel	5/26/2004	One page, attached PDF not included in documents. Author would like "our responses…[to] focus on the specific training of the 800th MP Brigade…to include an assessment of how well they performed during this training."
990-999	e-mail: MP Detainee Ops Training Guidance Question	5/18/2004	To see if leadership wants "Non-lethal Capabilities during disorder/disturbances with detainee operations" included in LTG McKiernan white paper for training guidance.
1000	e-mail: POW Abuse Statement	5/12/2004	"Please review and comment on proposed RTQ and Q and A." Attached word document not released to us.
1001-1004	e-mail: OIF Detainee Ops and OIF training Guidance, change 3	6/5/2004	Attached powerpoint documents listing tasks in which to train for detainee ops.
1005-1013	e-mail: FW Training documents	8/20/2004	Attached memo from Gen. Miller: "IAs arriving in support of OIF 2/3 must be trained to the standard in the unique task set required in detainee operations in order to facilitate the effective transfer of operations during the rotation of forces without degradation of operational capabilities." Tasks include: "Restrain a detainee", "Stress management",
1014-1018	e-mail: "training" extract	5/14/2004	"I believe that members of this unit had the requisite training to ensure that they were aware of and competent in the task needed to secure enemy prisoners of war, and to ensure that they were aware of the requirement for humane treatment." However, from the Taguba report: "The 800th MP did not receive...corrections specific training during their mobilization period...the 320th MP and the 372nd Mp had received no training in detention/internee operations. I also find that very little instruction or training was provided to MP personnel on the applicable rules of the Geneva Convention...Moreover, I find that few, if any, copies of the Geneva Conventions were ever made available to MP personnel or detainees." 1016: "Several detainees allegedly began to riot at about 1300 in all of the compounds at the Ganci encampment. This resulted in the shooting deaths of 3 detainees, 9 wounded detainees, and 9 injured US soldiers...the detainees rioted in protest of their living conditions...contributing factors were lack of comprehensive training of guards, poor or non-existent SOPs...no rehearsals or ongoing training...ROE not posted and not understood, overcrowding, uniforms not standardized, and poor communication between the command and Soldiers." 800th MP had low morale because they believed they were going home and were disillusioned: "...there did not appear to have been any attempt by the Command to mitigate this morale problem...there is abundant evidence in the statements of numerous witnesses that soldiers throughout the 800th MP Brigade were not proficient in their basic MOS skills, particularly regarding internment/resettlement operations. Moreover, there is no evidence that the command, although aware of these deficiencies, attempted to correct them in any systemic manner other than ad hoc training by individuals with civilian corrections experience....I find that the 800th MP Brigade was not adequately trained for a mission that included operating a pirson or penal institution at Abu Ghraib Prison Complex....I also concur that the units of the 800th MP Brigade did not receive corrections-specific training during their mobilization period...I found no evidence that the Command, although aware of this deficiency, ever requested specific corrections training from the Commandant of the Military Police School...I find that without adequate training for a civilian internee detention mission, Brigade personnel relied heavily on individuals within the Brigade who had civilian corrections experience, including many who worked as prison guards or corrections officials in their civilian jobs. Almost every witness we interviewed had no familiarity with the provisions of AR 190-8 or FM 3-19.40...BG Karpinski and her staff did a poor job allocating resources throughout the Iraq JOA. Abu Ghraib (BCCF) normally housed bwetween 6000 and 7000 detainees, yet it was operated by only one battalion. In contrast, the HVD Facility maintains only about 100 detainees, and is also run by an entire battalion...the quality of life for Soldiers assigned to Abu Ghraib (BCCF) was extremely poor. There was no DFAC, PX, barbershop, or MWR facilities...it appears that friendship often took precedence over appropriate leader and subordinate relationships...I find that there was clear friction and lack of effective communication between the commander, 205th MI Brigade, who controlled FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF) after 19 November 2003, and the Commander, 800th MP Brigade, who controlled detainee operations inside the FOB. There was no clear delineation of responsibility between commands, little coordination at the command level, and no integration of the two functions. Coordination occurred at the lowest possible levels with little oversight by commanders. I find that this ambiguous command relationship was exacerbated by a CJTF-7 Fragmentary Order...FRAGO 1108 made al of the MP units at Abu Ghraib TACON to the Commander, 205th MI Brigade. This effectively made an MI Officer, rather than an MP Officer, responsible for the MP units conducting detainee operations at that facility. This is not doctrinally sound due to the different missions and agendas assigned to each of these respective specialities.
1019-1021	e-mail with Powerpoint attachment: RE training for Treatment of Prisoners	5/12/1004	COL from US Army Military Police School sending "the initial task list we will use in developing the TSP".
1022-1026	e-mail: FW: Training for treatment of prisoners	5/15/2004	"Law of War and Hague/Geneva Convention tasks are included in the new OIF tng guidance for all deploying soldiers" MG Barrett writes (1024), "I'you reasonably sure we have made that distinction in training between GITMO and IZ, but will make sure REDACTED has worked the trap lines." MG Taguba writes (1024), "There is a major concern on treatment of detainees at GITMO vice in IZ. In particular, the application of the Geneva Convention to those detained at GITMO since they are categorized as members of terrorists organization, are stateless, and whereby the GC is not applicable. There is specific language in executive order that enumerates this. Members of Congress have questioned this during hearings this week." MG Burns writes (1025), "It occurs that we do not have time to wait for extended studies, and need to assure needed fixes are applied now to deploying training."
1027-1071	e-mail: VCSA Tasker--Detainee abuse	2/3/2004	E-mail with attached documents evaluating training of specific deployments--some received "T" ratings, others "P"…Powerpoint presentation of detainee and humanitarian concerns training.
1072-1074	Memorandum for Concerned Personnel	12/18/2003	Specifies rights and privileges of detainees (smoking, use of latrine, praying, etc.)
1075-1076	Memorandum for Concerned Personnel	12/18/2003	Guard Procedures and Policies: "Maintain and enforce the uniform policy…At no time will the guards remove their blouse while on duty."
1077-1079	e-mail: RE: Training for treatment of prisoners	5/12/2004	Another mailing of the "initial task list".
1080-1085	e-mail: Detainee Ops 24 Aug	8/24/2004	"Made the corrections…thanks" attached document entitled "Detainee Ops 24 Aug"--another copy of Info. Paper on changes after 60 Minutes broadcast.
1086-1089	e-mail: RE: Schlesinger Panel: Analysis of training requirements from CONUSAs and TSBs for deploying units--FORSCOM response	8/24/2004	Poses questions to be answered in response to shortcomings in training that led to detainee abuse. Responses redacted.
1090-1163	Report of 15-6 Commander's Inquiry	9/12/2003	In July 03 Psyops team member fowarded list of concerns re detainee operations within Task Force Iron Gunner, including: detaining Iraqis on "a whim" and based on personal feelings ("only 20 of 650 detainees interrogated have any real intelligence value"), stealing money from detainees, setting house on fire in front of distraught family, forcing the father of a 12-year-old boy killed in operations to wait days to recover the body and then father was "made to dig it up himself." (1091). Investigation concluded that most allegations were unsupported.Despite statements supporting some of the allegations (see e.g. 1155), it found:TF Gunner did not have written guidance or SOP re types of individuals to be detained; there was no evidence that [redacted] detained Iraqis "on a whim"; perception held by interrogators that individuals lack intelligence value and have been detained for no specific, discernable reason is often based on badly filled forms; issues with accountablity for detainee property are being rectified; fire and damage to house were incidental to lawful actions related to bunker on roof containing weapons; family requested to recover remains of 12-year old boy themselves; 82 out of 650 detainees were sent to TF Ironhorse for further interrogation. Recommends no further investigations.(1096). In one statement, DOD Civilian stated "I think that 80% of the people we bring in are "at the wrong place at the wrong time." (1138)
1164-1280	Report of 15-6 Commander's Inquiry	1/4/2003	Commander's report of inquiry (15-6 Investigation, December 2003, Mosul, B Co. 311th BI Bn) into broken jaw of a high school boy (such that the boy required his mouth to be wired shut and could only eat through a straw). The boy was hooded and placed in a room with "very loud music", and "was exercised without stopping for approximately 3 hours" while flexi-cuffed, and was "subject to being hit by water bottles. He had cold water poured on him and was yelled at repeatedly by roving guards." The report notes that at some point the victim "began crying and bleeding from his face, under the bag." [1206]. The victim claimed that a soldier threw him towards a wall and kicked him in the face and broke his jaw and his teeth. He was then told "to say that I've fallen down and no one beated me."[1185]. The report concluded that the broken jaw was caused either as a result of a blow by a US soldier or a collapse due to "complete muscle failure" from being excessively excercised. [1205] It found that ""Abuse of detainees in some form or other was an acceptable practice and was demonstrated to the inexperienced infantry guards almost as guidance" by 311th Battalion Military Intelligence personnel [1206]. Detainees were exercised "to the point of complete muscle failure or collapse." [1206] The guards... were either told to keep the prisoners awake, silent, and moving, or were not given any guidance at all." [1198-1199] Personnel "were striking the detainees", and evidence suggested that the 311th Military Intelligence personnel and/or translators "engaged in physical torture of the detainees." The report noted that detainees had sandbags over their heads, and "[t]he atmosphere in the detainee holding room was tense, emotional, and encouraged the guards to engage in abusive, out of control behavior." The victim was not interrogated when he was brought in, because of inadequate personnel - "if he had been interrogated it would have been determined that he was not the target and should have been released...". [1198-1199]. It was recommended that no punitive action be taken against the Commander of B Company, 311th MI Batallion [1173] despite the note in the report that "The 3rd and 4th Geneva Conventions were violated in regard to the treatment afforded to these detainees [1168].
1281-1336	Report of 15-6 Commander's Inquiry	12/28/2003	An AR 15-6 investigation into the death of Abu Malik Kenami in detention in Mosul, Iraq (311th MI Bn). The investigation is inconclusive but speculates that Kenami may have suffered a heart attack. The file notes that, on the day he died, Kenami had been “punished with ups and downs several times . . . and ha[d] his hands flex cuffed behind his back” (1285). He was also hooded, with “a sandbag placed over [his] head. (1284). “Ups and downs” are apparently “a correctional technique of having a detainee stand up and then sit-down rapidly, always keeping them in constant motion” (1284). He was found dead in the morning after having been placed in his bed cuffed and hooded. The file states that “[t]he cause of Abu Malik Kenami's death will never be known because an autopsy was never performed on him” (1292) and describes his death as "suspicious or questionable" (1282), for a time period that depends on "the violation and the punisher" (1284). For reasons that are not made clear in the file, Kenami's corpse was stored in a “reefer van” for five days before it was turned over to a local mortician (1298). The report blames the lack of Arabic-speaking medical providers (as opposed to any intent to harm Mr Kenami) for his death (1282), and a CID examination on 12/9/03 (1286). File includes photographs of how Kenami was hooded and cuffed (1290-1). 311th MI Bn had interrogated him (1296). Despite the report's conclusion that he exhibited no external signs, one sworn statement states that he may have died from hypothermia , and notes that he had a small scalp laceration and hematoma "which forces me to entertain trauma as a cause" (1331). Findings of post-mortem exam on 12/23 at 1332. The death certificate records the cause of death as natural (1332).
1337-1412	Report of 15-6 Commander's Inquiry	5/6/2004	Commander's inquiry (Not 15-6) into members of 3BDE, 101st ABN DIV who took video of themselves assaulting Iraqi detainee, and showed video to other members of platoon. Previous inquiry suggested video was played for seventy percent of third platoon "just for laughts" (1338), but present investigation determined 50 per cent saw it individually on laptops and cameras. The video is a 52 second clip that its maker refers to as "Jackass Iraq" (1340). Solider announces he will punch detainee, holds detainee and attempts to punch detainee in the stomach while filming, detainee moves, soldier then elbows detainee between the shoulder blade. Detainee's face "is noticeably distressed and looks as though he is breathing hard like he had the wind knocked out of him." (1341). Detainee could not be identified.Report is incomplete (based on index), recommends action be taken for misconduct against detainee (1346).
1413-1523, 1812-1919 entirely duplicative	Report of 15-6 Commander's Inquiry	8/28/04	15-6 Investigation found detainee abuse in 3 incidents: 1. In mid-June 2003, soldiers in 2nd Platon, 84th Engineers Company took detainee inside buidling, yelled and screamed at him, then [redacted] gave an order to removal all of the detainee's clothing, and the detainee was relased after his clothing was removed. (1429). This was described in witness statement as "discomfort and embarassment" (1442).2. Few days after first incident. Another detainee released after his clothes were removed. 3. On 7/3/03, ENG23 placed detainee against wall, bounced soccer ball off his head, hit detainee along with other soldiers. Also, 3 soldiers wrote sworn statements of use of M34 blasting device to shock detainees however this was denied by the accused. (1429) . Statements refer to shocking of 16-18 year old prisoner on feet and neck while he was in zip cuffs (1489), hitting looter with pistol, knocking him unconscious and "left him there bleeding and in zip cuffs" (1491). Statement refers to orders by Buldog 6 to "take them back and beat the fuck out of them", soldier states that although "we could shoot the looters" he didn't want to kill them so made them strip to embarass them instead. (1448; 1477; 1835) Soldier noted that "Bulldog" element shot and killed a looter (1418). Another statement notes that wehn looters were brought to Bulldog, Bulldog said that it was too much paperwork to keep them, and instructed soldiers to "ruff them up, or whatever we wanted" and let them go (1511). Soldier admitted to "thump[ing] detainee on the head." (1466). The file contains transmittals for Court-Matial Charges, including charges against soldier who authorized stripping, soldier who shocked detainee, and soldiers who struck and otherwise assaulted detainees. It also contains several recommendations of relief for cause (see e.g. 1476)
1524-1577	Report of 15-6 Commander's Inquiry	9/22/2003	15-6 investigation found that 3 detainees in squadron holding pen were punched and kicked by soldiers from HWB 2/2 ACR for several minutes. (1528;1532;1536). A witness reported hearing Iraqis "screaming for help and saying 'no mister no'" (1559). Soldier stated that "if someone is trying to hurt us then a roughing up is not bad as long as you don't kill them... I really don't know what is right and whats wrong as far as beating prisoners" (1549). Medic called to scene stated that one detainee had ruptured blood vessel in left eye, lump and bruise under right eye, pain while breathing and bumps on his skull under his hair. Second detainee had larger bumps to head and "lump on his forehead the size of a golfball with a fresh abrasion"(1563). Detainee stated that his ribs were broken (1569).
1584-1618	Report of 15-6 Commander's Inquiry	8/16/2003	Investigation into “alleged ROE and Geneva Convention violations” in Iraq. It includes sworn statements relating to “Bulldog 6” telling soldiers to “take the detainee[s] out back and beat the fuck out of them.” 1595, 1610. The final disposition is unclear as the file appears to be incomplete. Includes copy of Dragoons Rules of Engagement (which defines "abuse" to include stripping detainees)(1617)
1619-1755, 1767-1786	Report of 15-6 Commander's Inquiry	11/10/2003	An informal 15-6 Investigation into an August 16, 2003 incident of abuse by members of 1/A/1-41 IN attached to TF 2-70, while they were dropping detainees off to TF 1-13 for further questioning by the “3BCT MIT team” in Iraq. The MIT team saw the soldiers kicking blindfolded and “zipcuffed” detainees several times in the sides while yelling profanities at them. 1-41 infantry personnel claimed there was no kicking .1619. The investigation concludes that at least three TF 2-70 did abuse the detainees, including pushing/allowing detainee to fall from truck while blind-folded and zip-cuffed, violent kicking, and yelling profanities. The operation's leadership was present and failed to prevent events. 1620. The investigation adds that “some of the TF 2-70 may perceive that the chain-of-command is endorsing ‘pay-back' by allowing the units most affected by suspected detainee actions to play the greatest role in bringing those suspects to justice.” 1620. Recommended counselling, formal letter of reprimand and retraining. 1621. Includes 3rd Brigade Combat Team Detainee Cage Operations - presentation on Procedures and Lessons Learnt (1767-1786)
1756-1766	Report of 15-6 Commander's Inquiry	1/13/2004	Alleged war crimes by members of C Co. 1-41 IN, including unlawful guidance in dealing with POWs, firing on unarmed children and assault and murder of a child. 15-6 investigation found that evidence did not support any of alleged crimes. CID conducted investigation completed on 11/20/03 which found no evidence to support or deny allegations. No exhibits included.
1787-1792	Memo , B/Co 311th MI BN (2BCT)	1/2/2004	Describes process of apprehending and detaining Iraqi at BHA during operation Reindeer Games, and then releasing him after discovering that he was an NGO employee authorized to carry a weapon (1787-8). Instructions for Guard Force assigned to 2nd BHA (11/14/03) (1789-92).
1793-1801	Email from CPT,DCS,G-3 to multiple redacted recipients attaching USAMPS Detainee Operations TSP,	9/30/2004	Updated to include MG Miller MNIF Memo and other documents.
1802-1806	Information Paper on Detention of Civilians		Includes instruction "No detainees will be transferred to the control of another Coalition partner without SECDEF approval" (1806).
1807-1809	Memo to TF Ironhorse re Treatment of Detainees in US Custody, and EPW Checklist	9/21/2003	Memo to TF Ironhorse re Treatment of Detainees in US Custody, and EPW Checklist.
1810-1811	2 photographs of truck and people standing then kneeling (out of focus)
1920-2015	Investigation and Art. 15 proceedings documents	1/8/2004	Field Grade Article 15 proceedings concerning soldier punching detainee and stomping his feet. Sworn statements also allege that soldier "socke[ed] [detainees] in the gut" (see e.g. 1940). Medical exam revealed red markings on wrists from flexicuffs, tenderness to stomach area but no bruising, and one detainee had tenderness but no bruising to collarbone, jaw and abdomen (1941). Detainees alleged that soldier put his face against wall hand hit back of his head 2-3 times, "saying bad things about Allah and about our families" like "I want to fuck your sister" (1943, 1945). Soldier explained that he was threatened by detainee who he perceived was about to kick/attack him. Proceedings determined that he applied the appropriate amount of force to control the situation and was not guilty. (1932). Includes FRAGO 383A (General Order - Civilian or detainee mistreatment), including types of actions that are considered maltreatment (1978).